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Chapter 1
Original Sin

When my family first moved from Germany to Baltimore we lived across from
the inner harbor in historic Federal Hill. Federal Hill is one of the oldest neighborhoods
in Baltimore City with homes dating back to the mid nineteenth century. E. Montgomery
Street is paved with cobblestones, lined on either side with traditional Baltimore row
houses. Three marble steps lead up to the front door of a home no wider than thirteen feet
across. These narrow row houses had once been the homes of black dock workers and
called “alley homes” because of their close proximity to one another. Today, Federal Hill
is one of the most sought after neighborhoods in Baltimore. Homes once perceived only
fit for black occupancy are now worth over one million dollars. When I first moved to
Federal Hill it was not the gentrified, trendy neighborhood it is today.
For the first three years of my life in Baltimore I attended PS #45. Federal Hill
Elementary was one of the better public schools in Baltimore. Classes were small,
teachers knew your name, and students were generally bright. Our student body was
racially and socio economically diverse. Race was not something I was conscious of as a
kindergarten and first grade student.
When I was in first grade an older student brought a knife into school and held it
up to another student’s throat. The student wielding the knife was black and the other
student’s throat was white. Within a month my parents pulled me out of public school
and sent me to a private school in the suburbs. This was the first time I realized that there
was a difference between white and black – this was the first time I realized there was
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such a thing called race and that people made judgments based on the color of someone’s
skin. When the new school year started my family joined the ranks of millions of other
middle class white families before us and moved to the suburbs. We became the epitome
of the larger white exodus to the suburbs because my parents believed that downtown
Baltimore was dangerous based largely on its racial composition.
As I got older the racial segregation of Baltimore became increasingly apparent.
The neighborhood to which I moved, Roland Park, one of the first neighborhoods to
enforce racially restrictive covenants in Baltimore, is a racially and socio-economically
homogenous community comprised of relatively wealthy white residents. My parents and
my friends’ parents often warned us that there were certain neighborhoods we couldn’t
enter because of their racial composition. Walking through downtown Baltimore the
residential separation of black and white is glaringly obvious. Beyond the border of the
gentrified inner harbor and surrounding Federal Hill, Fells Point and Canton
neighborhoods, street after street of abandoned, dilapidated, Baltimore row homes
comprise densely populated black neighborhoods. Popular culture has even reduced
Baltimore to an archetype of decaying cities across the United States. Television shows1
including HBO’s The Wire attribute Baltimore’s decline into crime, drug addiction and
poverty to the simple explanation of white flight and black mismanagement of the city.
However here I wanted to look “under the wire”, underneath images of the most visible
social ills known for destroying America’s cities. Quiet as it is kept, Baltimore City has
played host to and been shaped by a much more enduring, and many times legal vice:
1

The Wire is not the only show about Baltimore City – Homicide: Life on the Street and
The Corner (the book which it was adapted from was written by David Simon and Ed
Burns, producer and creators of The Wire).
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residential segregation. At the heart of the city’s history lies a dark and shameful fact:
Baltimore was the first city in the United States to write into law residential segregation
ordinances that banned blacks and whites from living side by side. Baltimore’s
segregation ordinances became a model for cities around the country. Though the
ordinances were ruled unconstitutional seven years later their effects have shaped the
lived experiences and the built environment of Baltimore City up to the present. The
subsequent slum clearance agenda, the introduction of racially biased real estate practices
through redlining, racially restrictive covenants and blockbusting, and finally the race
based site selection of federal housing project locations around the city have made
Baltimore a tale of two cities, one black and one white.
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Chapter 2
Residential Segregation Ordinance

Baltimore was one of the first metropolitan hubs of the new republic. At its
foundation Baltimore was a city of contradictions, a city of both North and South, a city
of black and white, one of freedom and of bondage. Founded in 1729, Baltimore played
an integral role in the events leading up to the American Revolution as one of the first
cities to resist British taxation. In September of 1814, after burning Washington, D.C.,
the British moved to Baltimore. There, soldiers successfully defended the Baltimore
harbor from the British at Fort McHenry. These events led Francis Scott Key, a Maryland
lawyer, to write the Star Spangled Banner, which would later become our national
anthem. Baltimore became a major shipping and manufacturing center with the creation
of the Baltimore Ohio Railroad in 1830. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries Baltimore was a vital center of American commercial activity due to the
railroad as well as the shipping and ship building industries that occupied Baltimore’s
ports. By 1860 Baltimore had built a strong mercantile culture and had the fourth largest
population in the United States.1
Maryland wrestled with the issue of slavery as a state uniquely positioned in
between the North and the South. Though slavery prospered throughout the state,
Maryland was also the first Southern state to have an Abolition Society and Baltimore
boasted a large population of free blacks.2 Though free blacks created their own schools,
learned trades, bought their freedom, and had modest power to protect their freedom
through litigation, their freedom was also restricted in substantial ways.3 Free blacks in
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Maryland were restricted from working certain occupations, keeping dogs as pets,
carrying fire arms, or attending a religious service unless conducted by an ordained white
minister.4 Even after Maryland rewrote its constitution in 1867 to reflect a growing desire
for securing the socio-economic advantages of citizenship through its Declaration of
Rights, free blacks struggled to obtain basic legal privileges. As Maryland’s black
population grew, politicians could no longer ignore what was becoming a vocal political
body. Political opposition reported that, “during the republican regime a minority of the
colored population made themselves particularly offensive to the better elements of both
races so that the ‘race problem’ was for the next decade sharply injected into politics.”5
Thus, the conflict between the races shifted from an issue of enslavement to a question of
participation in city affairs.
By 1860, Baltimore had the highest population of free blacks of any city. Of its
212,418 inhabitants, 27,898 were black and 25,680 were free black residents (See
Appendix 24). Between 1880 and 1900 Baltimore’s black population increased from
54,000 to 79,000 (See Appendix 24). There was little conflict between white and black
city residents throughout the 1870s and 1880s. Baltimore’s black and white residents
were distributed throughout the city’s twenty wards and lived side-by-side without
conflict.6 Baltimore reflected the melting pot that came to define the United States. In
addition to a rapidly growing black community, more than thirty nationalities and races
made up Baltimore’s population.7
In the 1890s, industrialization and job opportunities brought immigrants from
southern and eastern Europe as well as former slaves to Baltimore. Like the white
Europeans immigrants these former slaves were drawn by the possibility of employment.
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However, unlike the free blacks that had established a community in Baltimore before the
Civil War, the new blacks were from rural areas and tended to be unskilled and poor.8
The new black Baltimoreans crowded together in “alley districts” that would become
Baltimore’s first slums. Alley districts were characteristic residential districts for blacks
in southern cities. Alleys were generally unpaved and muddy, lined on either side with
cheaply constructed row homes crowded closely together. Those who could afford to
move out did so and migrated to the north and west from the central and eastern districts
of the city. As the slums took shape, wealthy property owners sought a means to confine
blacks and the diseases they believed came along with them. Laws created by Baltimore
City officials demanded residential segregation in Baltimore City at the turn of the
twentieth century and although the ordinances only lasted seven years, their effects are
still visible today.
On Christmas Day 1925 the New York Times published the following headline:
Baltimore Tries Drastic Plan of Race Segregation. The story began, “On last Monday,
December 19, the City Council of Baltimore passed and the Mayor signed what was
probably the most remarkable ordinance ever entered upon the records of town or city of
this country…”9 Ordinance No. 610 “for preserving order, securing property values and
promoting the great interests and insuring the good government of Baltimore City”10 was
intended to achieve racial separation using citywide legislation. The ordinance was
prompted by the decision of a young black lawyer, George W. McMechen, to move his
family from Prestman Street in northwest Baltimore several blocks east onto McCulloh
Street. McMechen was a graduate of Yale Law School and a well-respected lawyer; he
was married to a schoolteacher and together they had three young daughters.11 Despite
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the fact that the McMechen’s were respectable neighbors, the residents of the 1800 block
of McCulloh Street failed to notice anything about the McMechen’s except the color of
their skin. A few days later the white residents of McCulloh Street met with neighbors
from the Madison Avenue, McCulloh Street, and Eutaw Place Improvement Association
to appeal to the city council to seal off their neighborhood from black residence. They
appealed to the Baltimore City Council for help. Baltimore City Councilman Samuel
Dashiell replied to mounting complaints about blacks moving into white residential areas,
“I am only able to say that the colored person, considered to represent the most
enlightened of the negro race, should have established his home in the midst of his race
and that he should have encouraged others of his race to do likewise…”12 From this
discourse emerged the first attempt to legally segregate blacks and whites in the United
States. The Baltimore City Council became the first body in the United States to enact a
residential segregation order.
The ordinance banned any white person from moving onto a block the majority of
whose occupants were black and banned any black person from moving onto a block the
majority of whose occupants were white. Throughout the nineteenth century Baltimore
City was not segregated based on race or class. However this fluid racial organization of
space began to change as industrialization and urbanization altered the landscape of cities
across the United States. Baltimore’s first slums were occupied by incoming blacks with
little money and limited job opportunities. Poor southern black immigrants crowded
together in a neighborhood called “Pigtown” in southwest Baltimore. Pigtown soon
became the city’s first sizeable slum.13 Black residents moved to northwest Baltimore as
middle class white residents, enticed by new cable and electric carlines as well as more
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space, moved to the suburbs. By 1908 the twenty-six-block area along Pennsylvania
Avenue, beginning at Franklin Street and extending north to the intersection of Druid Hill
and North Avenues, became “the” area for black Baltimore residents. By 1910 Madison
Avenue, Eutaw Place, Linden Avenue and McCulloh Street, all parallel to Pennsylvania
and Druid Hill Avenues, became the desired streets for affluent black Baltimore City
residents. Slowly wealthier blacks moved northwest to neighborhoods like Biddle Alley,
but poor living conditions followed close behind. Even those blacks that could afford to
move out of Pigtown could not afford first-hand housing and thus slums too developed in
the Biddle Alley neighborhood where blacks were the majority by 1903.
Blacks were not the only slum dwellers. Between 1870 and 1900 Baltimore City’s
population grew from just over 260,00 to over 500,000 (See Appendix 24). This
population increase was composed of European refugees, blacks and ex-confederates
who flocked to Baltimore. Immigrants and blacks faced the same problems – little
money, few jobs and housing shortages. Shared conditions resulted in overcrowded
homes that were poorly ventilated and lacked adequate plumbing.14 Immigrants tended to
occupy dwellings that black residents had abandoned in East Baltimore. By the time
immigrants moved in, however, these homes were third rate and in serious disrepair.
Thus both black residents and immigrants were forced to live in a rapidly aging and
deteriorating housing stock due to lack of money. Families could not afford even the
cheapest housing so they were forced to double and triple up creating drastically
overcrowded neighborhoods. Urbanization, industrialization and economic depression
had created a population of poor and sick inhabitants in Baltimore City. As disease began
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to spread throughout the slums of Baltimore City social reform became a necessity and
whites used health as a catalyst to advocate for containment.
At the end of the nineteenth century Jacob Riis published a book documenting the
plight of the urban poor. How the Other Half Lives became a best seller. Images of slum
conditions and overcrowding awakened upper and middle class American’s to the
dangerous conditions that existed in their backyards. Riis’s pioneering work in
photojournalism prompted the United States Congress to direct the Commissioner of
Labor to make “a full investigation relative to what is known as the slums of the city.”15
The study was to focus on the substandard living conditions of the poor. In 1894 the
Labor Commissioner released a report on The Slums of Baltimore, Chicago, New York
and Philadelphia. The study argued that the characterization of impoverished
neighborhoods as “slums” helped to justify the community’s response to poverty and
racial inequality.16 The study reached two surprising conclusions about Baltimore City.
First, its statistics demonstrated “no greater sickness prevailing in the [slum] district than
in other parts of the cities involved.”17 Second, the study determined that white people
represented the great mass of people residing in the slums. The study suggested that
Baltimore slums were 95.85% white and 4.12% black.18 These surprising conclusions
were ultimately proven to be inaccurate since the commissioner selected a
“representative” district at the center of the slum population from which black
neighborhoods were omitted. The study included the all-white eastside neighborhoods
and excluded the west side black districts of Hughes Street, Pigtown and Biddle Alley.19
Though this inaccurate neighborhood cross-section showed unwillingness on the part of
the Labor Commissioner to associate slums with race, because of the report Baltimore
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City officials were forced to confront issues presented by slum conditions that had been
previously ignored. At the turn of the century, the government of Baltimore City became
dominated by a reform agenda.
During the early twentieth century a movement designed to ameliorate social ills
swept the nation. The Progressive Movement was a product of the desire for a more
scientific approach to philanthropy. Focused primarily on housing of the poor, conditions
in factories, child labor and mental health care reform, members of the Progressive
Movement sought legislation to enact social change. Baltimore City had two different
types of social reformers: some joined the already established Progressive Movement in
opposing political machines and in advocating civil service reform, the merit system,
streamlined government, home rule, and corrupt-practices legislation,20 while another
group of reformers who came from universities and churches had a different agenda. The
second set of progressive reformers became a part of the Social Reform Movement.
The Social Reform Movement in Baltimore, led by the President of Johns
Hopkins University Daniel Coit Gilman, advocated initiatives designed to remedy the
fundamental ills of society.21 Unlike the Progressives who favored government action to
quickly enact change, social reformers sought gradual transformation through the
coordination of smaller social groups. Social reformers found support for their efforts
among the medical community. In the 1890s, Dr. William Osler, physician-in-chief at
Johns Hopkins Hospital, called attention to the social implications of typhoid and
tuberculosis and supported efforts to establish a pure water system. His colleague, Dr.
William Henry Welch, estimated that a better sanitation system in American cities could
save up to 100,000 lives each year. In 1897, Dr. John S. Fulton, Dr. Osler and Dr. Welch
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founded the Maryland Public Health Association. The association discussed proposals for
the construction of a sanitary sewer system and establishment of a city hospital for
infectious diseases (though the latter was poorly received and ultimately denied for fear
of reduced property values and spread of disease surrounding the selected neighborhood
site.)22
By 1902 the state government began a citywide campaign against tuberculosis.
This brought attention to the desperate housing situation in Baltimore since the campaign
stressed the relationship between overcrowding, lack of open space, tainted food and a
high incidence of tuberculosis. Since the black community occupied the worst housing
throughout the city, it was not surprising that the death rate of black residents from both
smallpox and tuberculosis was twice that of the white average.23 Though many attempts
were made to create charity organizations, settlement houses, playgrounds and public
baths, such initiatives failed to abolish poverty, prevent crime or to cure tuberculosis and
other infectious diseases. Thus, social reformers began to focus on a symptom rather than
the cause. As expressed by Baltimore Mayor Thomas Hayes in 1903, “These wretched
abodes are menacing to both health and morals. They are the breeding spots from which
issue the discontents and heartburnings that sometimes spread like a contagion through
certain ranks of our laboring element.”24 Slum housing became the social reformers’
personal crusade.
Instead of improving housing, however, reformers defined disease in terms of
race and poverty in order to justify racial containment as an effective strategy to combat
contagion. Reformers believed the poor, whom they labeled black, were carriers of
tuberculosis, typhus and other diseases (all of which poor blacks had in disproportionate
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numbers). Thus, blacks were labeled a degenerating race with a high mortality rate, low
birth rate and no future. Segregation of black residents was then justified as a means of
quarantining disease and protecting the healthy white population. City slums were
blamed for vice, crime, poverty and anarchy; thus, it followed that improved housing
conditions would cure the ills of society.
The reform agenda was put on hold, however, as the Great Baltimore Fire raged
through the city on Sunday, February 7 and Monday, February 8, 1904. The fire
destroyed almost all of downtown Baltimore, spreading across 140 acres and destroying
over 1,500 buildings. The burnt district corresponded roughly to the original sixty acres
of Baltimore Town. The city launched immediate relief efforts though fortunately there
were no deaths, few injuries and few were left homeless. Physically the city was rebuilt
much as it was before. The only major changes were the widening of Pratt and Light
Streets along the present-day inner harbor. Out of the rubble however, emerged one
major change to Baltimore: a sewer system. The Baltimore Fire turned out to be a
blessing in disguise as the combined efforts of rebuilding the streets, sewer construction,
and laying a high-pressure water system and electrical channels meant new planning
concepts. 25
The Great Baltimore Fire also heightened awareness on living conditions, which
helped dictate steps for recovery. Before the fire, in 1903, the Baltimore Association for
the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor and the Charity Organization Society
appointed a special committee to assess housing conditions in Baltimore City. The Great
Baltimore Fire of 1904 only reinforced their conviction that such a study was necessary.26
In 1907 the study was published with Janet Kemp, a member of the Federated Charities
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who conducted and compiled surveys for the study, as the primary author. The study was
designed to improve housing conditions in Baltimore due to the belief that “It had long
been known by those familiar with the alley [districts] of Baltimore, and with the section
occupied by our rapidly increasing foreign populations, that conditions existed in those
neighborhoods that could not but be detrimental to the welfare of their residents.”27
Initially, then, the study did not give these conditions a race. The study was concerned
with overcrowding, poor ventilation, lack of natural light, and ineffective sanitation.
The study entitled Housing Conditions in Baltimore City selected four districts for
study; two were described as tenement2 districts and two were described as alley districts.
The tenement districts were located on the east side of the city – one occupied by Russian
Jews near Albermarle Street (See Appendix 27), and the other by Poles in present day
Fells Point along Thames Street (See Appendix 26).28 The two alley districts were located
on the west side and were occupied primarily by blacks and some white German families.
One of the alley districts, bounded by Biddle and Preston Street, Druid Hill and
Pennsylvania Avenue (See Appendix 26), contained two hundred and fifteen
overcrowded houses with two hundred and seventy apartments.29 These homes differed
from tenements because they were not designed to function as separate apartments.
Instead, families crowded together in individual bedrooms and living spaces. These two
or three story high buildings were severely overcrowded, dark, dirty and dilapidated. The
second alley district, called the Hughes Street district (See Appendix 25), was stratified

2

These areas were described as “tenement” districts because three or more families
occupied many of the homes as opposed to “alley” districts, which were characterized by
houses crowded together on narrow streets. Homes in alley districts also frequently held
more than one family however they were not designed to do so.
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economically and socially.30 Hughes Street alone contained 120 homes with connecting
alleys and courts.31 The neighborhood was a filthy slum. Animal feces and garbage lined
the streets, cesspools overflowed into the streets. Cholera and typhoid were of the highest
threat in the Biddle Alley neighborhood. According to Kemp’s research there was not one
house on Biddle Alley in which there had not been at least one case of tuberculosis.32
Kemp’s study unabashedly linked slum conditions with race. She referred to the
residents of alley districts as “shiftless, irresponsible alley dwellers” citing a never-ending
circulation of beer, a prevalence of gambling and cocaine habits to this end.33 In the
Hughes Street district Kemp asserted, “many people seemed to have reached the bottom
level of degeneracy.”34 Kemp believed the “squalor and wretchedness” which
characterized the Hughes and Biddle Street alley districts were symptoms of the low
standards and absence of ideals she believed the black residents exhibited.
The report suggested changes that differed for tenements as compared to alley
houses. For the tenement districts, Kemp proposed a “market” solution based on race.
Kemp’s proposal for white tenement districts would force landlords to improve existing
tenements and require builders to construct model tenements according to regulations
restricting height, regulating light, ventilation and water, requiring separate toilets for
each apartment, and annual inspections. Kemp’s proposal to reform the black alley
districts, on the other hand, was far less accommodating. Kemp observed that “low
standards and the absence of ideals” were to blame for the conditions among the alley
districts.35 The report proposed to reduce density in existing alley houses, to condemn
those that were uninhabitable, ban sleeping in basements, and to prohibit the erection of
additional alley houses.36 Though the suggestions would improve the quality of housing,
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they would reduce the quantity. In essence, Kemp was suggesting legislation to isolate
black neighborhoods in order to protect the white community from crime and disease that
she argued would ‘logically’ follow black in-migration. In the end, the city took no action
on the Housing Conditions in Baltimore report but the links Kemp made between race
and urban space would continue to guide public policy in the Baltimore. The north and
west black neighborhoods continued to grow in population and size, gradually becoming
the worst slums in the city.
Slowly Baltimore’s black districts began to expand in population and in size.
Between 1900 and 1910 the population of blacks increased from 80,000 to 85,000. The
western boundary of the black district extended six blocks from Argyle Avenue to
Gilmore Street. By 1910, over 15% of the city’s total black population, 12,738, crowded
into the 17th ward of the city. Expansion of the black population was not without incident.
When a black family moved into a home on Stricker Street, located along the western
boundary of black residence, they were attacked and their house was stoned.37 Blacks
were unsuccessful in their attempts to move eastward past the boundary of Druid Hill
Avenue until the summer of 1910 when George F. McMechen and his family moved onto
the 1800 block of McCulloh Street.
On June 9, 1910 Margaret G. Franklin Brewer sold 1834 McCulloh Street to W.
Ashbie Hawkins. The Baltimore Sun, attempting to back up assertions that blacks
destroyed property values, claimed Hawkins had paid only $800 for the house whose
previous value was said to be $2,400. However, according to court records Hawkins
obtained at $1,900 mortgage for the house issued by the Ridgley Building Association.38
Hawkins was a prominent lawyer who had been a leader in the Niagara Movement,
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which was founded by W.E.B. DuBois in 1905 to oppose Booker T. Washington’s
policies of racial accommodation, or what some called subordination. Hawkins became
involved in Niagara’s successor organization the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, four years later. Hawkins’ work eventually led to the
formation of the NAACP’s legal department. Three weeks after Hawkins moved into
what had been a predominantly white neighborhood the Baltimore Sun published the
news with the headline claiming the city was under a “negro invasion,”39 Hawkins was
after all a black man encroaching upon one of the most fashionable neighborhoods in
Baltimore. Nearby Eutaw Place was home to Johns Hopkins University president Daniel
Coit Gilman, Dr. William Stewart Halstead, the father of American surgery, and the
future president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson.40
After purchasing the home, Hawkins rented it to his law partner George W. F.
McMechen, a Yale Law graduate, his wife and children. “We did not move up there
because we wished to force our way among the whites,” McMechen told the New York
Times, “association with them in a social way would be just as distasteful to us as it
would be to them. We merely desired to live in more commodious and comfortable
quarters.”41 White neighbors reacted violently. They threw stones at McMechen’s door
and windows, dumped tar on the steps and threw bricks through the skylights. Only
Arthur B. Rice and Irwin School, both nine-year-old boys living next door in the 1700
block of McCulloh Street, were caught. They were fined one dollar each.42 McMechen’s
presence in what is now considered Bolton Hill prompted whites to form the McCulloh
Street-Madison Avenue Protective Association. The Association resolved, “…colored
people should not be allowed to encroach on some of the best residential streets in the
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city and force white people to vacate their homes.”43 On July 5, 1910 a petition was
prepared requesting the Mayor and City Council to, “take some measures to restrain the
colored people from locating in a white community, and proscribe a limit beyond which
it shall be unlawful for them to go…”44
The McCulloh Street-Madison Avenue Protective Association’s desire for racial
segregation was consistent with increased segregation throughout Baltimore City and the
greater United States. Plessy vs. Ferguson established the doctrine of “separate but equal”
in 1896. Segregated housing already existed in many northern cities including Boston and
New York. Between 1907 and 1910 blacks began to be excluded from public parks,
theaters and hotels. Racial tolerance in department stores ended in Baltimore in 1910 as
more and more stores restricted blacks from trying on garments and prohibiting them
from returning clothing.45 Tensions in the McCulloh Street neighborhood escalated.
White resident M.Z. Hammen crossed the street to taunt Willam B. Hamer, a black postal
worker who had moved into the neighborhood because he wanted to rent a better house.
Hamer responded to Hammen, “I am as good as you are. You move on or I brain you
with this chair.”46 Hammen sought legal action but was informed by the magistrate that
Hamer had committed no crime since he merely threatened bodily harm. “The fact that he
is an undesirable neighbor,” explained the magistrate, “does not constitute a crime.”47
Milton Dashiell and Samuel L. West, two democratic City Council members,
recognized the growing debate surrounding residential segregation and its potential as a
potent political issue. William L. Marbury, a leading lawyer and resident of Bolton Hill,
volunteered his services as a legal advisor to Dashiell and West. Together, the three
drafted the first bill introduced to City Council intended to freeze existing racial housing
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patterns and prevent blacks from further encroaching on white neighborhoods. The
ordinance thus hemmed blacks into the alley districts and slum neighborhoods they
already occupied by legally preventing them from occupying streets with white residents.
Ordinance 610 became a municipal policy intending to preserve order, secure property
values and promote the great interests and inuring the good government of Baltimore
City. I will quote the ordinance at length:
…it shall be unlawful for any white person to move into or begin to occupy as a
residence or as a place of public assembly any house, building or habitation
within or upon that part of any street or alley way… within the City of
Baltimore… if at the date of the passage of this said ordinance… shall contain a
greater number of houses, buildings or habitations occupied as residences by
negroes or colored people than it does houses, buildings or habitations occupied
as residences by white people… it shall be unlawful for any negro or colored
person to move into or begin to occupy as a residence or as a place of public
assembly any house, building or habitation within or upon that part of any street
or alley way… within the City of Baltimore… if at the date of the passage of this
said ordinance… shall contain a greater number of houses, buildings or
habitations occupied as residences by white people than it does houses, buildings
or habitations occupied as residences by negroes or colored people.48
The ordinance stipulated that violating any of these provisions would result in a fine of
$100 or confinement in the Baltimore City Jail for not less than thirty days, nor more than
twelve months, or a combination of both. Furthermore nothing provided in the ordinance
should affect the white or Negro or colored residents, or the location of their residences,
previous to the passage of the ordinance.
Mayor J. Barry Mahool issued an explanation of the ordinance to the New York
times explaining, “the reasons leading up to this so called segregation ordinance have
been going on in the City of Baltimore for the past ten years.” Reflecting on Baltimore’s
unique situation as both Northern and Southern Mayor Mahool explained, “In the Far
South the Negroes would never dream of pushing their way into the white residential
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districts… In the North and West the Negro population is comparatively small… [in such
cities] there are not enough negroes to make it rise to the dignity of a problem.” Mayor
Mahool blamed black residents of Baltimore for “pushing up” into a neighborhood of
white residence, “… it is clear that one of the first desires of a negro, after he acquires
money and property, is to leave his less fortunate brethren and nose into the
neighborhood of the white people.”49 Though Mahool claimed the ordinance was not
directed toward the black race as a whole, it is clear through his justification of the
ordinance that it was specifically aimed at regulating black upward mobility.
City Solicitor Edgar Allan Poe issued an opinion supporting the ordinance and
declaring it constitutional based upon the state’s police power, “… [because] of
ineradicable traits of character peculiar to the races, close association on a footing of
absolute equality is utterly impossible between them, wherever negroes exist in large
numbers in a white community, and invariably leads to irritation, friction, disorder and
strife.”50 Poe continued his justification explaining, “a state has the right under its police
power to require the separation of the two races wherever the failure to so separate them
injuriously affects the good order and welfare of the community.”51 From these series of
events came the first residential segregation ordinance in the United States.
The emergence of a segregation ordinance in Baltimore quickly became a national
story. The New York Times proclaimed “nothing like it can be found in any statute book
or ordinance record of this country… it is unique in legislation, Federal, State or
municipal – an ordinance so far-reaching in the logical sequence that must result from its
enforcement that it may be said to mark a new era in social legislation.”52 The Times
noted that while this was not a new departure in legislation, numberless acts already
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existed providing the segregation of blacks and whites in street cars, schools and other
public places, the Baltimore ordinance was unique because it applied to all areas without
regard to the character of the space. While existing legislation was temporary in its effect
on black citizens, Baltimore’s legislation was permanent. The New York Times refrained
from evaluating the ordinance critically or positively, instead the article aimed to show
how radically different Baltimore’s legislation was from existing segregation laws. With
increasing national attention, Baltimore became the national leader in residential
segregation and the first city to sign residential segregation into law. Richmond, Norfolk,
Roanoke, and Portsmouth in Virginia passed similar legislation, as did Winston-Salem in
North Carolina, Greenville in South Carolina, Birmingham in Alabama, Atlanta in
Georgia, Louisville in Kentucky, St. Louis in Missouri, Oklahoma City in Oklahoma,
New Orleans in Louisiana, Indianapolis in Indiana, and Dallas in Texas.53
While it was clear that blacks would be opposed to such an ordinance, real estate
brokers and white property owners in mixed neighborhoods joined them in opposition.
Before the first ordinance was even passed Charles S. Otto, a Baltimore City property
owner complained,
I am also a property owner and I have a house i[sic] south Baltimore where one of
the owners have rented the next two houses from mine to colored. My tenants are
white. They tell me in spring they will move, now that this ordinance becomes a
law and if white people don’t move in my house I will have to pay expenses on
property that does not pay my [sic] in return. I approve in keeping colored people
to themselves and this ordinance as it is will work a hardship on property owners
all over the city. I would approve of a law where there is no colored people in the
block.54
This protest predicted future methods of residential segregation in the form of
blockbusting. White property owners were often scared into selling their property to
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black tenants for fear of decreasing property values attributed to black residency by
newspapers and real estate agents hoping to capitalize on white racism and prejudice.
Only a few days earlier, The Afro-American published an article refuting the notion that
black occupation reduced property values. The article stated, “many properties in the City
of Baltimore were enhanced in value by the occupancy of colored people…we were just
told last week by a real estate man that he has emptied a whole block of houses occupied
by white people who would not pay their rent, and put in colored tenants at a larger
rent…” The article firmly asserted, “real estate men are opposed to the West Segregation
Ordinance and it is needless to say we likewise.”55
Baltimore’s segregation ordinance underwent several changes throughout its
seven-year life span. Mayor Mahool signed a second draft of the ordinance on April 7,
1911 after Judge Harland and Duffy of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore declared the
ordinance ineffective and void because it was “inaccurately drawn”.56 There is no
published report of the Judges opinions but presumably the inaccuracy referenced was
located in the ordinance’s title. Section 221 of the City Charter of Baltimore provided,
“Every ordinance enacted by the City shall embrace but one subject which shall be
described in its title…” The title of the first segregation ordinance did not meet this
requirement. The ordinance declared the provision was, “an ordinance for preserving
order, security property values and promoting the great interests and insuring the good
government of Baltimore City,” without mentioning racial segregation of housing or
excluding black servants from the law so that they could live in white homes and work.57
The second version of the ordinance was revised to include the provision that black
servants were not prohibited from living with employers, and that all applications for
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permits to erect residential property must specify whether for white or colored persons
and the applications must be published in the newspapers for two weeks to permit
investigation.58 The third version of the ordinance added the provision that neither black
schools nor black churches could be established on white blocks and vice versa. Mayor
Mahool signed the third version on May 15, 1911.
Two years later, a criminal indictment was filed against John E. Gurry, “a colored
person”, for unlawfully moving into a residence on an all white block. The Criminal
Court of Baltimore dismissed the indictment against Gurry, finding the ordinance
illogical. Judge Elliott concluded that the ordinance would depopulate mixed blocks by
precluding blacks and whites from moving there since section one of the ordinance
excluded whites from blocks “in whole or in part black” and section two excluded blacks
from blocks “in whole or in part white.”59 The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed this
judgment believing that either blacks or whites could move onto mixed blocks because
the ordinance excludes blacks from blocks “in whole or in part” residential, in which all
residences were occupied by whites. However, the Maryland Court found the ordinance
unconstitutional because it took away the vested rights of the owner of a dwelling to
move into it if he happened to be white and the block was all black or vice versa.60 Thus,
the segregation ordinance proved difficult to enforce without divulging citizens of the
ability to live in a property they owned. Though the Maryland Court did not strike down
the ordinance on the basis of the right to property, this decision’s focus on the right of the
property owner indicated the basis upon which segregation ordinances would ultimately
be held unconstitutional across the nation.
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Despite this minor set back, the Baltimore City Council had a fourth segregation
ordinance prepared by the time the Maryland Court of Appeals signed the paperwork
striking down the third version of the ordinance. The fourth version, signed on September
25, 1913 provided:
... that nothing herein contained shall be construed or operate to prevent any
person, who at the date of the passage of this ordinance, shall have acquired a
legal right to occupy, as a residence and building or portion thereof…from
exercising such legal right…61
In rewording the ordinance to allow for property owners to occupy their property without
regard to race, the Baltimore City council hoped to circumvent the issue of property
rights that the ordinances blatantly violated.
The residential segregation ordinances of Baltimore City were originally justified
as a public health initiative. Using Social Darwinism3, reformers argued that a quarantine
on the black population deemed sick and unfit would help protect the healthy population.
Ultimately, the public health justification for residential segregation proved to be flawed.
The mortality rate among blacks from tuberculosis remained 260% higher than that of
whites, and the overall death rate from all diseases was 96% higher than that of whites.62
H.L. Mencken, a reporter for the Baltimore Sun from 1906-1948, commented on the
segregation ordinance’s effect on public health:
But who ever heard of a plan for decent housing for negroes in Baltimore? Most
of them live in filthy hovels, crowded together in the winter, breeding diseases in
themselves and constantly communicating these diseases to the rest of us. The
persons who govern us have never thought to look to this matter… The law
practically insists that he [the negro] keep incubating typhoid and tuberculosis –
3

Social Darwinism is the nineteenth century theory of evolution that developed the idea
of “survival of the fittest”. This theory goes on to explain that the hierarchy of races
within society is a direct reflection of genetic differences along racial lines. Therefore
dominant races are the “fittest” because they are genetically predisposed to superiority.
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that he keep these infections alive… for the delight and benefit of the whole
town.63
Here Mencken reveals his usual critique of American life and culture and particularly,
Baltimore City politics by commenting on the inability of Baltimore officials to “look
into this matter.” Mencken openly criticizes the segregation ordinances and those who
wrote them for insisting that “the negro keep incubating typhoid and tuberculosis” as the
laws forced blacks to live in tight quarters in small neighborhoods around the city.
Despite Mencken’s rampant racism, he established that containment does not enact health
reform. Even the next Mayor James H. Preston conceded that the segregation ordinances
failed to protect the health of the middle class, “The evil effects of the unhealthy state of
the negro race are not confined within their own numbers… Regardless of our efforts to
maintain [a] sanitary and healthful environment for ourselves and families the insidious
influence of slum conditions is carried into our very midst to defile and destroy.”64 In
short, the segregation ordinance failed under the guise of promoting public health and
fighting disease and instead proved disastrous for Baltimore’s black community as a
whole.
The ordinances limited the housing supply available to an increasing black
population and allowed property owners to inflate prices based on supply and demand.
By 1920, Baltimore’s total population had grown to 733,826 - 108,696 of which were
black. Though the ordinances did not seem to limit black housing opportunities on their
face, circumstances conspired to decrease the amount of homes available to black
residents citywide. Prospective black homeowners generally had a more difficult time
acquiring the loans necessary to purchase their own homes. Though building and loan
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associations existed, many refused to extend credit to black residents. According to
census figures from 1910, which show homeownership among blacks in 73 southern
cities with a black population of 5,000 or more, Baltimore ranked 72. Only 933 of the
city’s 85, 098 blacks owned their homes.65 Thus, limited supply and increased demand
for homes led to rising prices. Speculators often acquired homes and then converted them
into tenements for three or more families. Thus, black residents had no choice but to
crowd together in order to make rent.
In 1915 W. Ashbie Hawkins, the first black resident to purchase a home in
Baltimore in a white residential neighborhood, filed a challenge on behalf of the local
NAACP chapter that reached the Maryland Court of Appeals. The court delayed a
decision, pending the outcome of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of
a Louisville law modeled on Baltimore’s segregation ordinances. The Supreme Court
case was a product of a test case created by the NAACP to highlight the ordinance’s
unconstitutionality. The scenario involved William Warley, president of the Louisville
branch of the NAACP, and his attempt to buy a corner lot from white real estate agent
Charles Buchanan. The lot was in a white block but surrounded by black residents. The
contract arranged between Warley and Buchanan stated that Warley was not required to
complete his half of the bargain “unless I have the right under the laws of the State of
Kentucky and the City of Louisville to occupy said property as a residence.”66 The
NAACP wanted to create a situation of role reversal whereby the white real estate agent
was the one challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. As anticipated, Buchanan
sought fulfillment of the contract in the state courts and Warley used the ordinance as his
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excuse for not fulfilling. The state court ruled the Louisville ordinance constitutional and
therefore a valid excuse for Warley.
Three U.S. Supreme Court cases that had been previously decided led to the logic
for the US Supreme Court case of Buchanan v. Warley to succeed. First, in 1896 the
Supreme Court ruled separate but equal was constitutional in Plesssy v. Fergeson
effectively approving of Jim Crow laws. Thus, Plessy v. Fergeson allowed Baltimore’s
segregation laws because the ordinances did not reflect or specifically relegate black
residents to substandard or unequal housing. In 1908 the Court found the state of
Kentucky had the power to require racial segregation in a private college in Berea
College v. Kentucky. During this same era the Court had actively supported the credo of
“laissez-faire” in Lochner v. New York in 1905. In this decision the Court protected the
freedom of contract in the baking business from maximum-hour legislation. Lochner in
particular supported the rights of citizens to pursue private business transactions free
from state intervention. Thus, the NAACP hoped to appeal to the Court’s support of
business and protect Buchanan’s right to engage in private real estate transactions without
interference from the State of Louisville.
Buchanan v. Warley reached the Supreme Court in April of 1916. The Baltimore
City solicitor filed a brief supporting Louisville’s right to prevent a black from buying on
a white block, while Hawkins filed a brief opposing Louisville’s segregation law.67 On
November 5, 1917 the US Supreme Court overturned the ordinance on the basis of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of due process, “nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”68 The court ruled that a colored
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person had the right to acquire property without state legislation discriminating against a
person solely because of their color. Justice Day’s opinion found, “the difficult problem
arising from a feeling of race hostility” insufficient for depriving citizens of their
constitutional rights to acquire and use property without state legislation discriminating
against them on the basis of race.69 The court distinguished the ordinance from other
segregation laws because it destroyed the right of the individual to “acquire, enjoy and
dispose of his property” and was thus opposed to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Though the ordinance was discriminating on the basis of race, in the end it
was overturned due to the universal guarantee of right to property within the United
States.
The black community celebrated Buchanan v. Warley across the nation. In
Baltimore, the Afro-American said, “The joy in Bunkville when home run Casey came to
bat in the final inning of a famous game with the bases loaded is nothing compared with
the rejoicing in Baltimore, Richmond, St. Louis and other Southern towns over the
outcome of the Louisville Segregation decision.”70 The decision in Buchanan v. Warley
should have represented great strides for the black community in the realm of residential
segregation. The Afro-American optimistically predicted, “colored folk will not be
restricted to these sections, that they may hold property where they please, and live in any
property that they own.”71 However the end of the segregation ordinances did not mean
the end of state sanctioned segregation in Baltimore City.
Though Baltimore’s experiment with legal apartheid was short lived, the
residential segregation ordinances were only the first instance of institutionalized
residential segregation in Baltimore. In the next hundred years, Baltimore City politicians
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enforced residential segregation in de jure and de facto ways. Baltimore’s urban
landscape today is characterized by the segregationist practices of public officials and
private residents. One hundred years later one can see the lasting effects on both the
physical landscape and the social consciousness of Baltimore City and its residents. The
end of residential segregation ordinances did not mean an end to segregation in Baltimore
City. The respite and joy felt by black residents after Buchanan v. Warely was short lived
as city officials and private residents immediately embarked on a one hundred year long
crusade to maintain and implement further means of residential segregation.
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Chapter 3
Public and Private Partnerships in Residential Segregation

The end of racial zoning did not mean the end of residential segregation in the
city of Baltimore. Government initiatives and collective private action replaced
Baltimore’s residential segregation laws with the same intention of segregating white and
black residents. In 1918 Baltimore City’s boundaries expanded to the north, east and west
(See Appendix 31). Between 1920 and 1930 housing construction peaked at 6,000 homes
per year, most of them in the newly acquired territory giving the burgeoning middle class
a place to flee a rapidly aging housing stock in the inner city. As Baltimore’s black
population swelled, the boundaries of the segregated black community hardly expanded
at all, accentuating the desperate situation of housing for Baltimore’s black residents.
Baltimore public officials and civic leaders sought to maintain the silent conspiracy that
was residential segregation through official and unofficial means.
Mayor Preston was undaunted by the abolition of Baltimore’s segregation
ordinances. Preston sought advice from Dr. A.K. Warner of Chicago where plans to keep
blacks out of white territory were well under way. The Chicago Plan sought to “force out
blacks already residing in [white] neighborhoods and [to ensure] that no others entered.
The activities of [the white property owners’ association] consisted both of mass
meetings to arouse the neighborhood residents against the blacks and publications in
white journals of scathing denunciations of race.”72 This plan banded together public
officials, private institutions and white residents of Baltimore to combine de jure
segregation with de facto segregation. Slum clearance, restrictive covenants, redlining,
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and blockbusting set the stage for the federal public housing agenda to become the
primary vehicle for residential segregation in Baltimore City beginning in the 1930s.
The first test of Preston’s plan came in August of 1918. Through an anonymous
letter sent to the Mayor’s office Mayor Preston became aware that Louis Buckner, owner
of a house on Lee Street, proposed to rent the second floor of his three story home to
blacks in an all white neighborhood. Buckner promptly received a visit by the Secretary
of the Real Estate Board of Baltimore and the Inspector of Buildings for Baltimore.
Buckner was told that if the rental went through he would be cited for any code
violations. Buckner relented and promised not to rent to blacks.73 City building inspectors
and health department officials would cite code violations to those renting or selling to
blacks in white neighborhoods. Thus, the conspiracy of residential segregation seeped
into the inner workings of Baltimore City’s local government.
In addition to pursuing the Chicago Plan, Mayor Preston planned to use
condemnation as a land-acquisition tool to pursue racial segregation. As a pioneer of
Baltimore’s first government sponsored Negro removal project, Mayor Preston targeted
the area north of City hall for his a strategic “parking” initiative. The city began in 1914
to buy up properties that were used as rooming houses and cheap flats along St. Paul and
Courtland Streets between Lexington and Centre Streets. Under the guise of beautifying
the city, Mayor Preston cleared notorious sections of poor black neighborhoods that
surrounded the downtown business district.74 Three churches, the old headquarters of the
Afro-American newspaper, and the rented law office of W. Ashbie Hawkins and George
McMechen (known for their part in opposing the segregation ordinances) were all
destroyed. A park was created in the middle of bifurcated St. Paul Street and named after
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Preston. In 1917, after Preston Garden’s construction had begun, the Mayor declared that
health concerns justified the relocation of blacks on a faster scale and the creation of the
park. Preston proposed “the elimination of certain congested sections, populated by
Negroes, in which has been noted a very high percentage of deaths from…communicable
diseases…”75 He noted that the quarantine of black citizens would occur in order to
protect the health of white citizens as blacks constituted a menace to the health of the
white population.76 This was the second time in Baltimore’s segregation narrative that
public health concerns were used to justify residential segregation. When the project was
completed in 1919, some called it Preston’s Folly, others called it Preston Gardens as it is
still known today.77
Slum clearance began as an end in and of itself to eliminate dilapidated black
neighborhoods throughout Baltimore City. It then blossomed into an integral facet of the
public housing agenda with the passage of the Housing Act of 1940 and finally facilitated
urban renewal through the Federal Housing Act of 1954. The idea of slum clearance was
not new to Baltimore City. W.W. Emmart first suggested slum clearance in Baltimore in
1911 in his speech to the first City-Wide Congress. Emmart advocated the demolition of
poor black residential neighborhoods in order to protect “better neighborhoods” and in
the process attack “blight”, defined by overcrowded homes, impoverished residents,
substandard sanitation and high incidence of disease, as a general phenomenon.78 Emmart
depicted the cure to “blight”, a term that was equated with black areas of residence, as
clearance without community development,
The northwest section of Baltimore while in many ways the most desirable for
residential purposes has been steadily depreciating. This condition should not be
allowed to continue, when, by clearing out and replanning certain undesirable
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neighborhoods; the opening up of wide boulevards connecting together the
various parks or ‘squares’ of that section with Eutaw Place, a doubling of real
estate values would justify the cost and the increased taxable basis would without
doubt leave a margin of profit.79
Emmart’s keynote address set the stage for a slum clearance agenda, which ultimately
destroyed several of the cities worst slums displacing hundreds of black residents without
offering them another place to live. Slum clearance would be revisited when federal
funds were made available to Baltimore through the creation of public housing for the
nation’s poor in the 1930s and 1940s.
In the 1920’s city officials began investigating the possibility of clearing the Lung
Block – an area of the city notorious for its high concentration of tuberculosis and black
residence. The Federated Charities, through its Colored Board of the Western District,
drew up plans for the clearance of the area in 1913. The Urban League also surveyed the
Lung Block and pushed for the redevelopment project. After the survey, four square
blocks of houses were torn down and replaced by a whites-only school.80 Hundreds of
families were displaced by this slum clearance project though no plans were made to
provide alternate housing in other neighborhoods.
If Baltimore City officials could conspire to enforce segregation, why couldn’t
private citizens join the cause? The tactics used by city officials inspired private citizens
to adopt their own means of residential segregation – racially restrictive covenants.
Restrictive covenants were legal obligations imposed on the deeds of real estate imposed
by the seller upon the buyer to do or not to do something. Racially restrictive covenants
would require that only members of a certain race would occupy the property. As part of
a national trend, residents of Baltimore City banded together through neighborhood
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associations to draft agreements baring blacks from moving into their neighborhoods.
Though the government was not a part of the drafting of these agreements, their
constitutionality was upheld until the 1948 U.S. Supreme Court case Shelly v. Kraemer.
Homeowners and developers attached restrictive covenants to the deeds of homes
especially in the North and Northwest regions of the city. Such covenants hemmed black
residents into specific neighborhoods and prevented them from out-migration. The
housing development of Guilford to the north of the city explained, “At no time shall the
land included in said tract or any part thereof or any building erected thereon be occupied
by any Negro or person of Negro extraction.”81 Nearby Roland Park prided itself on
building restrictive covenants into the deeds of all the homes it built thus creating
Baltimore’s first homogenous community of upper class white residents.
The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the legality of restrictive covenants in
1938 in Meade v. Dennistone, often referred to as the NAACP’s attempt to “sue Jim
Crow out of Maryland with the Fourteenth Amendment.”82 In 1936 Edmond D. Meade, a
young black pastor, signed a contract to buy a house at 2227 Barclay Street in Baltimore.
Mary Estelle Dennistone, owner of 2221 Barclay Street and Mary J. Becker, owner of
2234 Barclay Street, along with fifteen other property owners along the 2200 block of
Barclay Street signed an agreement on November 14, 1927 stating that
neither the said respective property nor any of them nor any part of them or any of
them shall be at anytime occupied or used by any negro or negroes or person or
persons either in whole or in part of negro or African descent except only that
negro or persons of negro or African descent either in whole or in part may be
employed as servants by any of the owners or occupants of said respective
properties and as and whilst so employed may reside on the premises occupied by
their respective employers...83
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The covenant applied to an area of twenty-four square blocks and included the house in
question. Dennistone and her neighbors hired the by now familiar William L. Marbury,
one of the collaborators of the original segregation ordinances, to file suit on their behalf
in an effort to restrain Meade and his family from moving in. Charles Houston of the
NAACP took on Meade’s case and provoked the suit, hoping the case would allow him to
attack racial discrimination. Meade asserted that this contract denied him equal protection
of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ultimately the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the use of racially restrictive
covenants drawing upon the precedents set by Plessy v. Ferguson that separate but equal
satisfied the conditions of equal protection and the Civil Rights Cases which forbade
public, but not private discrimination.84 The Court asserted through preceding cases that
the constitutionality of restrictive covenants was within the power of the state and thus
covenants were protected. The use of racially restrictive covenants would continue until
1948. In Shelley v. Kraemer the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the use of restrictive
covenants holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state from enforcing
restrictive covenants that would prohibit a person from owning or occupying property
based on race or color.85
While America was in the throes of the Great Depression, President Roosevelt
introduced a practice that would alter perceptions of race, religion and national origin in
American cities. The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) began mapping 239
cities dividing and color-coding neighborhoods according to their perceived risk in terms
of mortgage loan security. These maps were not enforced by the state but used by
banking institutions to determine the distribution of loans and mortgages. Factors
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included age and condition of housing alongside race, ethnicity, class, religion, economic
status of residents and the overall homogeneity of the neighborhood. These factors were
organized into a racial hierarchy of economic risk. “Redlining”, as it was commonly
known, added a cartographic dimension to residential segregation and discrimination.
Neighborhoods were to be classified by color – green indicted best, blue indicted still
desirable, yellow indicated a definitely declining neighborhood and red meant
“detrimental influences in a pronounced degree, undesirable population or an infiltration
of it.”86 On these maps all white neighborhoods were colored green while all black
neighborhoods were literally color coded as red, giving economic security a racial
complexion. By labeling predominantly black neighborhoods as undesirable, the federal
government encouraged stereotypes that dictated housing opportunities for black
residents across the United States.
Baltimore’s mapping began shortly after the opening of the HOLC’s Baltimore
office on July 24, 1933. The agency sternly warned appraisers to document “infiltrations
of lower-grade population or different racial groups,” into white neighborhoods, with this
example, “Negro – rapid.”87 These colored maps guided mortgage lenders in assessing
which residents or neighborhoods were risky or sound investments. Thus, a two-tiered
lending system was born where white residents could obtain loans from banks while
black citizens were forced to get their financing from speculators. By forcing black
residents to obtain loans from a less formal or regulated lending market, black residents
were subject to the whims of greedy speculators, eager to take advantage of vulnerable
buyers by charging increased rates.
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Discrimination was not limited to race. Nationalities were rated based on their
real estate desirability according to a system of hierarchy developed by John Usher
Smyth, a zoning activist. English, Germans, Scots, Irish and Scandinavians were rated at
the top of the list while Russian Jews of the lower class were ranked number seven and
Negroes number nine.88 Though it was acknowledged that some whites might move up in
the ranks, black residents had no chance. Homer Hoyt, leader of the HOLC, stated, “If the
entrance of a colored family into a white neighborhood causes a general exodus of white
people, such dislikes are reflected in property values.”89
Most of inner city Baltimore – stretching one mile north and south from City Hall
and two miles to the east and west – was redlined as hazardous for conventional
lending.90 The McCulloh Street row houses, now completely inhabited by black residents,
were within this area as were the homes on Eutaw Place and the neighborhood of Bolton
Hill. All of the black neighborhoods throughout Baltimore were redlined with the
exception of Wilson Park and Morgan Park, which were rated blue due to their
surrounding white neighborhoods (See Appendix 1).91
By the late 1930s the HOLC was absorbed into the Federal Housing
Administration. While the FHA in effect invented the modern mortgage system and
guaranteed loans to creditworthy borrowers it also institutionalized redlining by
promoting homeownership in new, primarily suburban neighborhoods that were racially
homogenous. Furthermore, the FHA recognized and adhered to restrictive covenants at
times upholding covenants even after they had expired.
Redlining opened the door to another means used to both clear out and contain the
black population of Baltimore: blockbusting. Real estate speculators often sought to
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generate panic among white homeowners in neighborhoods on the cusp of change. They
tried to convince people that there were black families moving into the neighborhood a
consequence of which would be a decrease in property values. Speculators convinced
white homeowners to sell before the value of their property was cut in half. Speculators
would then advertise that house in only African American newspapers to get the first
black family on a block that was all white. With the help of HOLC’s maps, classifying
the desirability and value of homes in Baltimore’s neighborhoods based on race, real
estate agents were able to capitalize on the panic of white homeowners. Furthermore,
racially restrictive covenants allowed real estate agents to buy low and sell high.
In such a tentative real estate market, real estate agents strategically sold or rented
homes in less desirable, but still mostly white, neighborhoods to black families. Shortly
after the first black residents moved into a borderline neighborhood, white residents
panicked and moved out. Real estate speculators capitalized on the panic. Brokers
purchased whole blocks at a distressed price from nervous white sellers and sold at a
premium to desperate black buyers. After a block was “busted” by the initial new
residents, real estate agents helped to flip neighborhoods from white to black and profited
off of vulnerable black buyers who were unable to obtain loans for housing any other
way.
Baltimore real estate duo Manuel “Manning” Bernstein and Warren S. Shaw
opened the Manning-Shaw Realty Company in 1953 under the premise of using
blockbusting techniques. The black and white pair sought to break white neighborhoods
and profit off of their blockbusting techniques.92 Westward expansion of the black
community occurred because of blockbusting. Up until the mid 1940s the western
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boundary of black residence was at Fulton Avenue. White residents occupied one side of
the street and black residents occupied the other side. When the first black family crossed
that boundary in 1944 the floodgates opened and the black community expanded
westward with unprecedented speed. To be sure blockbusting was a strategy that came
long after the advent of Federal Public Housing, but the role of public housing in shaping
the racial landscape of Baltimore is so central that it deserves its own free standing
discussion.
Federal Public Housing was a cornerstone of the New Deal agenda of the 1930s,
as a solution to the problems of the urban poor bred in slums. Social workers, municipal
reformers and planners believed decent housing was the key to uplifting the urban poor.
After President Roosevelt signed the National Industrial Recovery Act in June 1933, the
Public Works Administration was organized under Secretary Ickes. Ickes established a
Housing Division within the PWA to establish a federal housing program. The goals of
the program were to relieve unemployment through jobs needed to build the projects, to
furnish decent, sanitary dwellings to those whose incomes were so low that private
capital was unable to provide adequate housing within their means, to clear or rehabilitate
slum areas, and to demonstrate to the private sector the practicability of large-scale
community planning.93 Despite good intentions, federal public housing was used as an
instrument for the imposition of segregation throughout the United States, an example of
which can be found in Baltimore City. The increase of racial residential segregation in
Baltimore after the 1940s was due to a coordination of local city officials and federal
government programs intending to sustain, increase and legitimate the residential
separation of blacks and whites.
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Site selection criteria was one of the primary vehicles through which federal
public housing reinforced existing residential segregation patterns. In November 1939 the
United States Housing Authority published site selection criteria in the Federal Register.
These criteria were used for the next thirty years. The first criteria required “permanency
of character” of the project meaning that the project should be built to last the length of
the loan (sixty years) and that the site be appropriately positioned within the city as to
withstand changing social patterns. Thus, planners were forced to study the effect of the
project’s location on the city plan and the effect of the location within the city plan on the
future of the project. Another consideration was the “sectional distribution of housing”
which worked to divide the location of projects based on employment concentration,
topographic barriers, and neighborhood preferences of racial groups. For example if a
project served people of a particular race, job skill category or some other socioeconomic
classification the USHA cautioned not to restrict their mobility within the metropolitan
area by selecting an inappropriate site.94
With respect to race the regulations stressed that “where it has been decided that a
project should be built to serve families who are predominantly of a given race, care must
be exercised in selecting a site which will not do violence to the preferences and
established habits of members of that race or to the community of which they may be a
part.”95 Thus, the federal government supported local authorities in using Federal Public
Housing to further reinforce the separation of blacks and whites in Baltimore City.
In August 1933 Governor Albert Ritchie appointed Abel Wolman, the State
Health Department Engineer, to head Maryland’s State Advisory Committee to the Public
Works Administration (PWA). In October 1933 Wolman created the Joint Committee on
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Housing in Baltimore recommend sites for public housing locations. The committee was
chaired by W. W. Emmart and comprised of planners, architects, and engineers, but not
social workers or groups that represented the black residents of the areas discussed.
Emmart later added Dr. Ivan E. McDougle, professor of sociology at Goucher College, to
the committee. McDougle was regarded as an expert on race relations and the local black
community though he embraced the doctrine of separate but equal in race relations.
McDougle’s appointment sanctioned the doctrine of separate but equal in Baltimore’s
housing program in the 1930s.96
The Committee selected areas of study based on nine characteristics.4 First, the
conditions of the dwellings were below a minimum standard for habitation, second, there
was a loss of population due to unsatisfactory conditions, third, health and sanitary
conditions were sub par, fourth, a declining tax return to the city, fifth, the proximity to
better areas, sixth, accessibility to employment and inexpensive transportation, seventh,
natural boundaries rendering the areas potentially self-sufficient and independent
neighborhoods, eighth, public equipment of streets, schools, sewers, etc, and ninth, areas
without probable future value except for dwelling use. The Committee balanced these
characteristics to evaluate the desirability for rehabilitation of the areas studied.97
African Americans living in extremely poor building conditions occupied area 1.
It was described as compact and well bounded area with good transportation and
churches. Health conditions in area 1 were poor as evidenced by the highest tuberculosis
rate per assessed area. Population had decreased severely between 1900-1910. Despite

4

The Report of the Joint Committee does not explicitly state where areas 1-9 are located
within Baltimore City.
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being occupied by black residents the Committee recommended the tract be reused for a
white low rental group of clerical and technical employees. Area 2 was described as
being in the “heart of the Negro belt of Baltimore” with 172 people per assessed acre in
contrast to a city-wide average of 31.6.98 Despite overcrowding the neighborhood lost
20% of its population between 1920 and 1930. The Joint Committee attributed this loss to
the “decay of buildings beyond the point of even low level Negro occupancy” revealing
their belief that black Baltimoreans tended to occupy dismal dwellings.99 Despite a
negative assessment, the Joint Committee recommended this area be slated for Negro
occupancy. This recommendation illustrates the fact that the Committee did not believe
black neighborhoods were worthy of rehabilitation efforts.
Area 3 was originally white except for alley houses however white evacuation of
the neighborhood led white homes, some previously mansions, to be converted into
colored tenements. This resulted in a depreciation of improvements, substandard health
conditions and high rates of juvenile delinquency. However the Committee noted that the
area was adjacent to many important public buildings and areas of commercial use. Thus,
the Committee concluded the city was losing revenue through inefficient use of the area.
This led the Committee to slate Area 3 for redevelopment as a neighborhood for upper
class white residents. It continued, “There is no good reason… for it to be inhabited by
colored people as they are incapable of paying the rentals…” The area should be
reclaimed from a depopulated colored tenement district to an ideal residential
neighborhood for white-collar employees.100 Again the Joint Committee was quick to
slate an area with potential for white residence using words such as “reclaim” to press the
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notion that black residents had no business residing in such an “ideal” residential
neighborhood.
Area 4 was described as naturally hemmed in by railroad traffic and automobile
traffic. It was long ago abandoned by whites and replaced by three story dwellings
packed with black families. The Police Department and Family Welfare Association
reported bad social and health conditions in the area. Infant mortality was nearly twice
the city-wide rate and tuberculosis was also markedly high. Due to already poor
conditions and the natural hemming in of the neighborhood the Joint Committee deemed
the neighborhood “certainly only useable for Negro habitation…”101 Area 5 was another
naturally bound neighborhood with the lowest social and health conditions. The
population was almost entirely black. Despite the fact that these conditions were quite
similar to other areas of study, the Joint Committee concluded more data was necessary
in order to decide what to do with the neighborhood. Finally, Area 6 was located in the
oldest part of Baltimore with most of the homes over ninety years old. The area was not
naturally inhabited by black residents but had been repopulated by black migrants. Area 6
reported high infant mortality rates and the heaviest percentage of disease in the city as
far as tuberculosis. Due to large streets fit for re-planning and the likelihood of an
infiltration of industry this area too was slated for white redevelopment.102
The recommendations of the Joint Committee clearly exhibit racist attitudes. Only
areas so far condemned that they were not even remotely fit for white habitation were
slated for black residence. Of the areas slated for black residence, no mention of
rehabilitation or revitalization efforts was made. Most of the areas studied were
recommended for rehabilitation so that white residents could move back in. Thus,
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Baltimore City’s rehabilitation agenda was motivated and dictated by racial
characteristics and favored white residents.
The committee identified a number of factors that caused blight in Baltimore City.
First, Baltimore’s land area had tripled during its last annexation in 1918 (See Appendix
31). The city had spent its planning capacity and resources on the development of
suburban areas within the annex. Second, planners in the 1920s had zoned a large area
around the central business district as commercial with the assumption that the downtown
would continue to expand. Instead, development of the annex, and industrial
suburbanization in the early decades of the century had shifted development to the urban
periphery. Third, the Great Depression worsened blight. When speculative owners were
unable to collect rent from tenants on relief, they let their properties fall into tax
delinquency. Finally, as the migration of blacks to Baltimore increased throughout the
1910s and 1920s, the neighborhoods surrounding downtown Baltimore had become
predominantly populated by black residents. White Baltimoreans effectively hemmed
black residents into these areas by means of race restrictive covenants enforced to protect
new white neighborhoods from encroachment.103 Additionally, Baltimore officials
strategically placed public housing projects on the cusp of black and white neighborhoods
to create natural barriers and further hem black residents into specific neighborhoods.
The Baltimore Sun reported on the survey conducted by Emmart in an article
written by P. Stewart Macaulay entitled, A Basis for a Baltimore City Plan:
Recentralization of Population and Elimination of “Blighted” Areas. Macaulay reported
that Baltimore had,
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…expanded and flourished along her circumference and that, at the same time,
she has been nourishing a rotten core. Suburbs have spread out on all sides, many
of them springing up miles away from the heart of the city. And downtown, in the
older sections, populations have been declining, houses have suffered from
obsolescence and dilapidation and whole neighborhoods have been threatened
with imminent abandonment.104
The committee concluded that rehabilitation of such areas would restore property values
and bring higher tax returns to the city of Baltimore.
In March 1934 the Baltimore Urban League undertook a project to complete their
own survey of The Negro Community of Baltimore. The goal of this study was to present
a comprehensive picture of Negro life in Baltimore, ascertain the specific social needs of
the community, and provide a factual basis for a constructive social program.105 The
survey responded to the racial assumptions in Baltimore urban policy by reporting on
questions of population, public health, employment, housing and crime within black
residential areas in Baltimore City.
First, the study addressed the issue of population. As of 1935 there were
approximately 145,000 black Baltimore City residents. The ratio of whites to blacks
remained constant in Baltimore City until 1920 when it increased five times as rapidly as
the white population of the city.106 Contrasting later reports about in-migration of black
residents from Southern states, the Urban League report believed most of Baltimore’s
increase in black population was due to movement of black citizens from rural Maryland
to the city.
Employment was the second most important topic for the Urban League as the
results of the survey helped explain the condition of black residents. The white
population of Baltimore could be found working in the manufacturing and mechanical
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industries while the black population worked primarily in domestic and personal service.
Black and white residents competed for employment in the realm of industry where both
were accepted for unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. In the area of domestic help, however,
black residents dominated over available jobs. The Urban League found that nearly threefourths of the city’s female domestics, and more than half the males engaged in domestic
service were black. Black residents were excluded from skilled crafts, white-collar work,
and public service. Finally, the report classified an area of employment aptly called
“racial service”, a field created by the automatic separation of the races, which included
the public service group, separate public institutions and business establishments that
catered to the black community’s needs i.e. beauticians, barbers, insurance, etc. This
group provided employment for about 5,500 of a total population of 108,696 black
Baltimore City residents.107
The Urban League concluded that unemployment was one of the greatest
obstacles black residents had to overcome in Baltimore City. Over forty percent of black
families in Baltimore were receiving relief due to unemployment as compared to only
thirteen percent of white families. Generally wages of black workers were lower than
wages of white workers. Further exacerbating the issue was that blacks tended to be
employed in the lowest paid and least skilled jobs.108 Low wages, higher rates of
unemployment, and higher rents explained why, in 1934, the black community of
Baltimore faced extreme economic hardships. This is further reflected in the inability of
black residents to move out of blighted areas, as white residents were able to do.
More than two thirds of Baltimore’s 33,000 black families lived in four of the
city’s twenty wards.109 These statistics speak to the inability of blacks to migrate out of
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the blighted neighborhoods to which they were confined due to segregation laws,
restrictive covenants and an inability to afford or gain financing to buy a home. The
Urban League believed that underlying the problem of housing for black Baltimore City
residents was the fact that black residential areas tended to be areas of second-generation
homes. Such areas frequently featured out of date homes that did not meet sanitary
provisions. Although these homes were designed for the use of one family, given that
thirty-three percent of all black families took lodgers (as compared to 24.2% of white
families), their size was conducive to black families taking in more and more lodgers to
help pay rent. Thus, these homes became rapidly overcrowded. The Urban League
concluded that the solution for the problem of black housing is, “first of all, an adequate
solution of city planning and housing reconstruction.”110
The Urban League made a study of six housing areas covering a population of
20,000, mostly occupied by black residents. The committee chose the six areas because
they were “blighted” and because homes were beyond rehabilitation, population was
declining, health and sanitary conditions were substandard, tax returns were low, and the
areas generally had little future value except for dwelling purposes.111 The report found
that Baltimore did not have “slum areas” but instead the central business district was
ringed by blighted areas defined as such by, “a high percentage of tax delinquent property
either occupied or unoccupied, on which repairs had not been made for a long period.”112
The Urban League drew several conclusions about the condition of life for black
residents of Baltimore City. Generally, the population of Baltimore per acre was 31.8.
Within the areas studied the population per acre ranged from 87.3 to 172 indicating
severe over crowding.113 The tuberculosis rate in these areas ranged from six to eleven
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times the rate in the entire city and the infant mortality rate was 30 to 50 points higher
supporting the claim that standards of public health were worse in black residential
neighborhoods. As with the original segregation ordinances, the coincidence of black
neighborhoods being targeted for slum clearance was justified by public health fears.
Furthermore, the study showed that the crime rate in two of the six areas was 43.6 and
24.9, as compared to the average city crime rate of 8.7.114 As other organizations
previously, the Urban League too mislabeled the causes of residential segregation as the
symptoms of “blight”.
Summary paragraphs about each of the six areas studied are indicative of attitudes
towards blacks in Baltimore and reveal differing standards of living conditions for the
white and black residents of the city. Area 1, though primarily inhabited by black
residents, was slated for re-use by a white low rental group. Due to the proximity of good
schools, churches, shops and amusement centers for black residents Area 2 was slated for
rehabilitation and occupancy by a somewhat higher income group. The Urban League
believed Area 3 should be reclaimed from an uninhabited black tenement district to a
residential neighborhood for white white-collar employees. Area 4 was deemed, “only
useable for Negro habitation” due to heavy automobile traffic on either side creating a
naturally “hemmed in” neighborhood. Area 5 was characterized as having very bad
housing and poor social and health conditions. Area 6, according to the Urban League,
was not naturally a black area but had been repopulated by black residents do to
obsolescence. The League believed the black inhabitants in Area 6 should be evacuated
from the area to make room for white families.115
The Urban League’s classification of each area reveals the attitudes of housing
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planners toward black housing issues facing Baltimore City. Although black residents
primarily inhabited all six areas, the Urban League planned to make three of them
available for whites and two available to blacks. These three areas should be turned over
to white residents and rebuilt, according to the Urban League, because of their proximity
to public transportation and the desirability of their location.116 Only Area 2, where
buildings were decaying was said to have, “no other value except for Negro residence
and never will have,” and Area 4 which was, “certainly only usable for Negro habitation
unless commerce and industry can absorb it, which seems doubtful,” were reserved for
black residents.117 Thus, even though the Urban League acknowledged racism as the
cause of blight they still conceded that salvageable neighborhoods should be given to
white residents.
The conclusions of the Urban League’s study of housing conditions reveal
contrasting ideas about housing removal and rehabilitations based on race. The League
did not hesitate to suggest that neighborhoods fit for white residence, but currently
inhabited by black citizens, should be evacuated and turned over to whites. Thus clear
priority was given to white residents over black and no thought was given or suggestion
made as to where the displaced black residents should relocate. Even neighborhoods that
had historically been inhabited by black residents like Area 3 were turned over to white
residents because they had not deteriorated to the point that they were suitable for black
residence. Furthermore, neighborhoods like Area 4 were deemed suitable for black
residence solely on the basis that had natural barriers promoting segregation. The Urban
League thus made no secret of their belief that areas that could be rehabilitated should be
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returned to white use while neighborhoods that were deteriorated beyond repair should
either be occupied by blacks or demolished entirely.
“The Health of the Baltimore Negro is more than a matter of medicines, hospitals
and doctors,” began the section of the study entitled Keeping Healthy, “It is intricately
interwoven with the problems of economic security, literacy and cultural levels…”118
Thus, while Urban League officials preserved quality land for white occupancy, these
reformers also saw direct links between health, housing and structural racism. The
mortality rate of black residents in 1934 was the same as that of white citizens twentyfive years earlier. In 1933 the death rate among the black population of Baltimore City
was 1,663 per 100,000 of the population, over a third higher than the white death rate. In
1933 seven diseases – heart ailments, pneumonia, tuberculosis, nephritis, cerebral
hemorrhage and softening of the brain, venereal disease and cancer – were the cause of
71% of all deaths in the black population.119 The infant mortality rate for black babies
was higher than for white as well with 87.5 per 1,000 black babies dying before their first
birthday and only 53.2 per 1,000 white babies dying before their first birthday. As
exemplified in the section of the study designating neighborhoods for white or black
occupancy, high rates of disease, infant mortality and death were reason to condemn a
neighborhood as unfit for white inhabitance. The Urban League used poor health of
residents as justification to label a neighborhood condemned.
The Urban League considered the importance of several factors that contributed
to the higher rates of death and disease among the black population. Being generally
poorer, black residents frequently could not afford medical treatment. Furthermore, in
1926 a study of hospital and dispensary care available to black patients in the city
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revealed that it was inadequate. Wards were so overcrowded with beds that there was no
space for a chair or a table, that of 535 available rooms there was only one private room
and five semi-private rooms available to blacks and finally, there was a theoretical oversupply of 205 beds for white patients and a lack of at least 70 beds for black patients
because of Jim Crow care.120 Thus, the Urban League exposed factors beyond the control
of the black population of Baltimore but that were attributing to generally poorer health.
The Urban League’s survey also devoted a section of its research to the discussion
of race relations in Baltimore City. The League concluded that segregation and separation
had, “tended to prevent the Negro’s adequate social functioning in the Baltimore
community.”121 Baltimore blacks, uniquely caught in a city with northern and southern
affiliations, enjoyed freedoms of northern cities such as sitting in any seat on the bus, yet
were discriminated from department stores. Schools and movie theaters were segregated,
the survey noted, yet Maryland was the only state in the United States with an Interracial
Commission created by the State Legislature and appointed by the governor.122 The
Interracial Commission was responsible to, “consider questions concerning the welfare of
colored citizens of Maryland, recommend legislation and sponsor movements looking to
the welfare of such people and the improvement of interracial conditions.” Thus,
Baltimore’s black residents in 1935 found themselves at a crossroads between enjoying
more rights and privileges than blacks in the Deep South and extreme discrimination and
segregation on the part of white citizens and institutions as compared to the north. This
disparity reflects the fundamental confusion in Baltimore’s identity as both a northern
and southern city.
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The Urban League concluded with a series of recommendations and reforms
based on its’ findings. First, the report advocated that steps be taken to improve housing
conditions. The Urban League criticized present inclinations to, “develop new segregated
Negro areas in the more remote sections of the city”123 and urged persons close to the
black community to be consulted before plans were drawn. Second, the League cautioned
public and private officials to acknowledge the need for secure employment for black
residents. In the realm of public health the League advocated a “vigilant, militant and
intelligent campaign against venereal diseases (and tuberculosis).”124 Additionally, the
League advocated for an improvement in care for mentally ill black residents, higher
education for black students at public expense, and increased employment for blacks in
the field of public health. Most importantly, the League emphasized the importance of the
ballot and organized political presence in Baltimore City affairs, an idea that was far
ahead of its time.
Both the survey conducted by the Joint Committee and the study conducted by the
Urban League pointed out similar characteristics of residential life for black
Baltimoreans. Life in predominantly black neighborhoods was characterized by poor
health, high crime, unemployment, and overcrowding. However the Joint Committee and
the Urban League differed in their recommendations. While both the Joint Committee
and the Urban League recommended rehabilitation of areas that could be converted for
white use, the Urban League also made several pointed recommendations to improve the
overall quality of life for black residents in Baltimore while simultaneously improving
the built environment. Furthermore, the Urban League focused on structural constraints
inflicted upon black residents that subsequently perpetuated bad behavior rather than
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blaming race as the cause. Still, it is no surprise that ultimately Baltimore officials
favored the recommendations made by the predominantly white, city government
employed Joint Committee as opposed to the predominantly black Urban League. Using
the growing body of evidence to suggest that life in black residential areas was
substandard, the city council took advantage of the opportunity to legitimize segregation,
slum clearance, and quarantine practices with the advent of federal public housing.
Studies like these reinforced motivations for segregated housing projects since so many
social ills were equated with race. Thus, housing authorities around the country found
justification in demolishing areas of black residence to make room for housing projects
that severed to quarantine and divide the city into black and white.
In March 1934 the Associated Architects, comprised of architects who had served
on the Joint Committee and had participated in the aforementioned study, submitted an
application to the Housing Division for $31 million for seven housing projects on five
different sites. In June, the Housing Division allocated $2 million to Baltimore.125 Based
on the Joint Committee study the Associated Architects ultimately chose the McCulloh
Street area for four projects on two adjacent sites. The McCulloh street area, bounded by
Dolphin Street to the northwest, Druid Hill Ave to the southwest, Biddle Street to the
southeast and Madison Ave to the northeast was seen as integral to the Associated
Architects as it would, “provide adequate housing for two rent brackets of negros and two
rent brackets of the white population.”126 Site 2-A was described as:
once luxurious buildings of the post-bellum period, from which the well-to-do
owners have departed nearly twenty years ago… Reinhabited as multiple
dwellings by colored people, the properties now owned as income producers have
been allowed to disintegrate to a point of practical uselessness… fifty-four
[houses] are now vacant and are considered untentable. This is the most advanced
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case of ‘blight’ in the city… [The site] is close to the centre of colored shopping,
education, amusement and population.127
The Associated Architects believed that adjacent site 3-A was suffering due to its
proximity to the most serious area of blight in the city and its proximity to an area of
black residence. If site 2-A was rehabilitated, the Architects believed site 3-A, “could and
should be a white residential neighborhood, buttressing property values in the
conservative and well liked white residence to the North, now terribly threatened by the
dilapidation to the South and West of it.”128 From this plan one can see that the
Architects, like the Joint Committee and Urban League before it, intended to build public
housing projects in areas that would ultimately stabilize and benefit nearby white
neighborhoods. Black residents would be removed from border areas and contained in
concentrated public housing more centralized within black neighborhoods. Furthermore,
the strategic placement of projects between white and black neighborhoods allowed the
buildings to act as barriers between the neighborhoods.
Both the black community and white planners supported the location of 2-A
between a white and black neighborhood but for drastically different reasons. Black
community leaders believed that redeveloping the area where the city’s largest black
community intersected with a middle-class white neighborhood and the business district
would strengthen community bonds and eliminate racial boundaries. White planners, on
the other hand, prized these projects because they would reinforce segregation in the area
where the controversy over residential segregation first began.129 Planners chose a site on
the border between the slums at the south end of the black neighborhood in the Northwest
and the Eutaw Place neighborhood to establish a buffer between a black and a white
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neighborhood.130 Assistant architectural engineer W.E. Trevvett believed that the purpose
of the proposed redevelopment sites was, “not for slum clearance but rather [for] using
the projects to block the negro from encroaching upon white territory.”131
Though originally planners wanted to construct two projects for black occupancy
on the west and two projects for white occupancy on the east, ultimately federal and local
officials resolved only to proceed with a project for black occupancy in the McCulloh
area, between the white and black neighborhoods. A new site for white tenants was
located in the Waverly neighborhood, which had a population slightly more than half
black within an otherwise white community. Thus, in keeping with the primary goal of
housing officials to reinforce, strengthen and expand white communities, the housing
stock where the black population of Waverly lived would be removed to make room for
the white projects.132
Segregated housing projects were common around the country during the 1930s.
Between 1934 and 1937 the PWA contracted for 51 projects in 36 cities, forty-nine of
which were built in the continental United States. By 1937, twenty-one of the projects
were occupied exclusively by white tenants, fifteen were occupied exclusively by black
tenants, seven were racially mixed with tenants assigned by race to separate buildings or
wings and only six were racially integrated.133 Roosevelt’s policy provided for a large
level of discretion on the state level meaning states were free to reinforce, create or
breakdown existing patterns of segregation as they pleased. In Baltimore, however, a
long history of segregated housing predated federal public housing and thus, the agenda
of segregation prevailed.
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The agenda of slum clearance to make room for federal housing projects was
never realized in Baltimore City. In January 1935, the Federal District Court of the
Western District of Kentucky ruled in United States v. Certain Lands in City of
Louisville, Jefferson County, KY that the Federal government did not have eminent
domain to conduct slum clearance for public housing.134 On July 20, 1935 the Appellate
Court upheld the lower court’s ruling. Following this decision the Housing Division
instructed the Maryland Commission to abandon the McCulloh and Waverly projects and
seek vacant land sites instead. The McCulloh neighborhood was eventually absorbed into
the nearby Maryland Institute College of Art (MICA) while Waverly slowly declined.
Today, Chesapeake Habitat for Humanity rehabilitates abandoned and dilapidated row
homes in Waverly. The Housing Division suggested a site for black projects in southwest
Baltimore and a site for white projects in east Baltimore creating the racial boundaries
now deeply ingrained into Baltimore’s landscape.135
In 1937, the United States Housing Act replaced the Housing Division of the
PWA with the United States Housing Authority (USHA). The new division differed from
the PWA in that it was restricted to granting financial and technical aid to local Public
Housing Authority’s. The goal of USHA was to, “assist the several States and their
subdivisions in alleviating present recurring unemployment, and to remedy the unsafe,
and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and sanitary
dwelling for families of low income in rural or urban communities.”136 Between 1938 and
1941 USHA built approximately 132,500 units in 163 housing projects nationwide. 35%
were housing projects occupied exclusively by black tenants, exclusively white tenants
occupied 21%, and 44% were racially integrated or bisected.
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The national pattern of segregation in housing projects was reflected in Baltimore
City. The New Deal housing program set a precedent in 1934 with its “neighborhood
composition rule” which prevented federally funded housing projects from altering the
racial composition of their neighborhoods. The Housing Authority of Baltimore City
(HABC) was formed on December 13, 1937 shortly after the creation of USHA. Mayor
Howard Jackson appointed five men to the authority’s board of commissioners including
Clarence W. Perkins as the executive director and one black man, George Murphy. The
HABC was consistent with national patterns of segregated housing projects building only
white and black projects and no mixed projects. Thus the HABC not only endorsed
segregation but also increased it. The HABC selected five sites from among the
“extensive regions of blight” identified in the 1934 Joint Committee report. The HABC
classified the cause of blight in racial terms, “The inhabitants of these alley dwellings5
usually succeed in moving into the perimeter of the block when their interior houses
become ruinous. This in turn forces the white street dwellers to abandon the street.” 137
The HABC decided to place a black project, Frederick Douglass Homes to the north and
a white project, Clarence Perkins Homes, in the south. In order to address the issue of
relocating families displaced by slum clearance projects, the HABC also decided to build
two projects on the outskirts of Baltimore City (one white, one black) to house the
displaced residents.
One Baltimore resident agreed that there was a profound racial logic to public
housing saying “it appears that the boundaries of colored neighborhoods will be
expanded somewhat by the pressure to find homes for those driven from slum clearance
5

Residents of alley dwellings were generally black.
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sites.”138 This tactic allowed planners to justify segregation when planning housing
projects. The HABC often sited the black residents in a prospective project site as a
“serious social problem” believing that “clearing the area of its present population will go
far to reverse the present trend to depopulation in this part of the city.”139 Again the
HABC linked race to social ills such as poor health, crime, poverty and unemployment,
here falsely naming the conditions of black residence as the cause, rather than a symptom
of larger conditions.
On October 4, 1939 the groundbreaking on Baltimore City’s first governmentsubsidized homes began. On the corner of Poppleton and Saratoga streets, deep in the
heart of West Baltimore, federal housing official Nathan Straus broke ground on what
would become “Poe Homes” when it opened for residents on September 28, 1940.140 The
project replaced 315 slum houses with homes for 298 black families.
The first five public housing projects opened in the early 1940s, Edgar Allen Poe
Homes, Latrobe Homes, McCulloh Homes, Douglass Homes and Perkins Homes, were
located in neighborhoods surrounding the central business district.141 Three of the
projects, Poe, McCulloh and Douglass homes, were designated for black residents while
the remaining two, Latrobe and Perkins homes, were reserved for whites.142 The desire to
manipulate and reinforce racial boundaries became more apparent in the site selection of
Latrobe and Perkins Homes. Latrobe Homes, for example, straddled the boundary
between a receding white Catholic community and a growing black community in east
Baltimore. In strategically placing all-white Latrobe projects in this neighborhood, the
HABC hoped to return the area to white use and push the black community out (See
Appendix 32). The Baltimore Sun noted, “that the site was selected deliberately to halt
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the northward expansion of the East Baltimore Negro District.”143 Similarly, Perkins
homes were placed to reinforce residential segregation in East Baltimore by removing a
pocket of black residency that was surrounded by white neighborhoods (See Appendix
3).144
In all, slum clearance projects made way for the five federal housing projects,
which displaced 2,733 families.145 The projects consisted of low-rise blocks of about six
attached units with a small front yard. They were generally arranged in a grid pattern and
public space was minimal. Five more projects were built in the 1940s for war workers
and four, Fairfield Homes, Brooklyn Homes, Westport Homes and O’Donnell Heights,
were located on vacant land outside the inner city in areas of heavy industry. Some of
these homes were only intended to provide temporary shelter. But Brooklyn homes, for
example, were composed of one thousand wooden units and were not demolished until
1962.146147
Ten years after the study of blighted areas conducted by the Joint Committee and
the Urban League, the Commission on City Plan released a report on the Redevelopment
of Blighted Residential Areas in Baltimore, Conditions of Blight Some Remedies and
Their Relative Costs on July 1, 1945. The plan emphasized containment of black
residents. The Commission chose five sample areas of blighted neighborhoods for its
study: South Waverly, of mixed use and race in 1945 but previously a predominantly
white community, University Area, of mixed use and race in 1945 with the northwest
section predominantly black; Camden, of mixed use and race but a predominantly black
neighborhood; Armory, of mixed race but mostly white and primarily residential, and
Broadway, mostly black and mostly residential in 1945.148
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The Commission found these areas to be representative of the variations found
within blighted areas as to density of occupancy, race of population, rental range and
location in relation to the center of the city. The City as a whole was 19.4% non-white as
compared to 44.9% non-white in the blighted areas studied. Population gain based on
race throughout the city was mirrored in blighted neighborhoods. Between 1930 and
1940 the total population in Baltimore gained 6.7% - the white population gained 4.6%
and the non-white population gained 16.6%. In the blighted areas the total population
gain was 3.8%, with white population loss of 5.44% and non-white population gain of
17.83%.149 Thus, blighted neighborhoods still followed patterns of overcrowding and
predominantly black residence. Though federal public housing was intended to be a
solution to the problems of the urban poor bred in slums, clearly it was addressing a
symptom rather than attacking the cause itself.
The Federal Housing Act of 1949 created the Urban Redevelopment Agency and
gave it the authority to subsidize three fourths of the cost of local slum clearance and
urban renewal projects. In Baltimore project construction in the 1950s was guided by the
Federal Housing act and by the Baltimore City Housing Authority’s report Baltimore’s
Blighted Areas. The report sparked the urban renewal movement in the city after it
classified most of the inner city as blighted. Title I of the Housing Act provided support
and federal subsidies for slum clearance and private redevelopment while Title II
authorized, nationally, the construction of over 800,000 units of public housing to aid in
relocation and ease the housing plight of the poor. The enthusiasm surrounding urban
renewal stopped short at public housing. Between 1950 and 1969 only five new projects
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and three extensions (total 4259 units) were opened as opposed to the twelve projects
(5421 units) built in half the time during the 1940s in Baltimore.150
The first two redevelopment projects undertaken included the Waverly
development and the Hopkins-Broadway developments. The Waverly project would
displace almost 200 families, more than half of them black, and build 291 new homes for
white occupancy. The Hopkins-Broadway site was home to 1,175 families, 1,138 of
which were black. The plans would displace 956 families replacing the slums with only
178 “moderately” priced units for black occupancy, 656 and 506 other dwelling units
would be priced at market rate. In the case of the Hopkins-Broadway site blacks
represented almost 90% of those to be displaced while 85% of the new dwellings were
set aside for whites.151 In the end displaced black families were increasingly compacted
into already overcrowded black neighborhoods due to economic constraints and racially
restrictive covenants. The Urban League objected that the “segregation of colored
families in the Waverly area, the limited access of Negro tenants to the Hopkins project
and the creation of added blight by rehousing displaced Negro families in areas which are
now overcrowded does not constitute redevelopment.”152 However as before, Baltimore
officials were not interested in creating new housing opportunities for black residents or
replacing the housing they demolished to make way for white projects or far fewer black
homes. Instead, Baltimore officials were only concerned with removing blacks from
areas that they believed were better suited for whites. Rather than create a permanent
solution for the housing shortage for black Baltimore residents, Baltimore officials
merely perpetuated a problem that had been growing since the turn of the century.
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In Baltimore in 1941, white tenants occupied 701 public housing units while
black tenants occupied 1,125 units.153 Thus, white occupancy was out of proportion with
their residence and black residents were disproportionately excluded from occupancy. By
the 1950’s there were more than 9,000 public housing units in Baltimore City.154 The
HABC continued its agenda of slum clearance and increasing population density with the
use of high-rise elevator buildings. Lexington Terrace, opened in December 1958,
replaced 457 structures housing 561 predominantly black families with 677 units in four
eleven-story buildings. George B. Murphy Homes opened in October 1963, replacing 473
structures and 561 families with 758 new units.155Studies showed that the inner city black
population was in the greatest need of public housing. Less than ten percent of white
households lived in substandard housing in 1960, one third of non-white households did.
Despite this fact the first project built in the 1950s, Claremont, was built outside the inner
city in a white neighborhood for white tenants (See Appendix 33).156
Though the head of Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) could have
interpreted Brown v. Board of Education (1954) as a mandate to desegregate public
housing, Albert M. Cole did not overtly subscribe to the court’s mandate to integrate.
Instead, the HHFA released a new urban renewal plan which linked public housing to the
need to relocate impoverished, displaced, inner city, minority residents away from white
neighborhoods where black children would be able to integrate schools.157 The Federal
Housing Act of 1954 modified urban renewal and redevelopment by requiring effected
communities to adopt code enforcement, relocation and other methods to prevent further
spread of urban blight. This mandate led to the construction of high-rise, inner city
projects filled almost exclusively by black residents. The now infamous Layfayette
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Courts was the first of many high-rise style projects opened in the early 1950s and early
1960s.158
The second half of the 1960s brought many changes to the public housing agenda
in Baltimore City. Most importantly, federal aid became available for the rehabilitation of
existing units for low-income occupancy and the leasing of existing units for public
housing tenants. In 1969 Baltimore’s housing authority started a new public housing
program modeled after one in Philadelphia using the funds made available by federal aid.
The program called “Rehab Housing” converted vacant row houses into public housing
units throughout the city. The first major rehabilitated project opened at Mount Winans,
next to Westport Homes. The program was eventually renamed the Scattered Site
program and eventually rehabbed 2,845 units with $40,000 to $45,000 in federal funds.159
The homes that were selected for rehabilitation reinforced existing residential patterns
thus creating areas of black concentration.
In 1964 the government passed the Civil Rights Act, which introduced the
concept of racial equality into federal programs. It was not until 1972, however, that
racial and economic integration became a formal goal of the public housing site selection
policy.160 For the first thirty years of the public housing agenda in Baltimore local
officials disguised the blatantly segregationist program of public housing as “reducing
blight” in the inner city. In fact, local officials used public housing to reinforce and
enhance the existing separation between white and black in Baltimore City. Until 1964
the only official racial consideration governing the location of public housing sites in
Baltimore was the USHA requirement that the Local Housing Authority preserve, rather
than disrupt, community social structures, which in fact served to justify further
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segregation.161 However in Baltimore, public housing sites were selected to disrupt
community and residence patterns. Whenever possible, Baltimore officials strategically
placed a project in a site either to convert a neighborhood on the cusp of integration into
white residence or to create a racially boundary between two areas. Thus, most housing
projects built before 1964 reinforced and perpetuated racial segregation as it existed in
Baltimore due to the segregation ordinances, slum clearance, restrictive covenants,
redlining, and blockbusting.
Baltimore began to officially integrate its public housing program in 1965. The
all-white projects, Brooklyn Homes, O’Donnell Heights and Claremont, were most
affected by this new agenda (See Appendix 33). Integration was well planned and
executed at Brooklyn and Claremont however residents and members of the surrounding
community of O’Donnell strongly opposed integration. New black tenants were excluded
from many nearby shops and recreational facilities so although the housing projects
themselves were integrated, the community did not welcome new tenants with open arms.
Integration in Baltimore never involved bringing white residents into predominantly
black areas – instead it always meant moving blacks into a predominantly white
neighborhood.162
Similar problems faced Flag House Courts, an inner city project that changed
from white to predominantly black due to a racially changing neighborhood rather than
new integration policy (See Appendix 33). When it was built in 1965, Flag House Courts
was located in a predominantly white neighborhood with Little Italy on one side and a
Jewish community on the other. Slowly the Jewish community migrated to the suburbs as
black residents moved in. The manager of Flag House Courts observed exploitation on
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the part of white shopkeepers and severe exclusion despite the “integration” of black
residents in a predominantly white neighborhood. 163
Ultimately the desegregation of housing projects in Baltimore was deemed a
failure. More than fifty years after housing projects were forced to integrate, in 1995
black residents of Baltimore’s public housing projects filed a class action suit against the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Housing
Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) for establishing Baltimore’s public housing system
as a segregated program. In 2005 Thompson v. HUD was decided in favor of the black
residents and the segregationist practices of the HABC were officially acknowledged.164
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Chapter 4
Riots and Revival

For three days following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King on April 4,
1968 Baltimore erupted in a series of civil disturbances that further altered the social
climate and physical landscape of the city for years to come. One Baltimore resident
recalled, “After news spread that Martin Luther King Jr. had been shot, you could feel the
tension in the air everywhere.”165 The city of Baltimore was overcome by an upheaval of
racial violence that left six dead, dozens injured and hundreds of public and private
buildings almost all but destroyed. White-owned commercial spaced in black
communities were specifically targeted here. Liquor stores, drug stores, taverns and
grocery stores were the most frequent targets of burning, looting and vandalism. One
hundred and twenty seven grocery stores were looted, another thirty were looted and
burned, three were burned but not looted and twenty-nine showed signs of vandalism.
Seventy-four liquor stores were looted, sixteen burned and looted, and four burned
without looting. Thirty-two drug stores were looted, two were burned, eight were
subjected to fire and looting and four were vandalized. Looting was reported at forty
taverns and bars, two were burned, nine were looted and burned and signs of vandalism
were found at seven other locations. A total of 1,049 businesses were damaged.166
Though the unrest lasted no more than three days, the violence spread over a
thousand city blocks. The area covered by the riots was bounded by Patterson Park
Avenue to the East, West Belvedere Avenue and 33rd Street to the North, Hilton Street
and Hilton Road on the West and Pratt Street and Washington Boulevard to the South.167
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The events culminated in the deployment of thousands of armed National Guard troops
across the east and west Baltimore on the orders of Governor Spiro Agnew and the
addition of regular Army troops by President Lyndon Johnson. Although the riots were
sparked by Dr. King’s assassination, the onset of violence in Baltimore’s black ghettos
was long anticipated. During the winter and early spring leading up to the riots of 1968,
black spokespeople had urged Baltimore’s white politicians to respond to the need for
better housing, job opportunities and recreation in Baltimore’s black ghettos. Milton L.
Holmes, administer of CORE’s job-training program in Baltimore in the 1960’s
explained the mounting tension, “The potential of violence is definitely here because of
the racist society we live in. The white people have not been sincere in their efforts to
improve the status of black society…they got to be concerned about the feeling of
rebellion in the black community.”168 Both black and white city officials predicted civil
disorders during the summer but still plans were not made to address growing concerns of
black city residents. Instead, the assassination of Dr. King in April 1968 triggered a
devastating expression of years of frustration and anger that manifested in rioting across
Baltimore City.
The riots of 1968 forced white and black Baltimore residents to confront the racial
tensions and disparities that many had ignored for sixty years. For the first time white city
officials were forced to contend with the blatant inequality of housing, employment
opportunity, educational opportunities, resources and official attention toward black
ghetto neighborhoods in East and West Baltimore. However, Urban renewal and
redevelopment projects that occurred as a result of the riots only further segregated
Baltimore City residents. Visions of redevelopment focused on the business and tourist
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corridor centered around the inner harbor alongside renovation of the streets hit hardest
by the riots while continuing to neglect the blatant needs for housing, educational, and
social service development throughout black communities. In the end the riots gave life
to the possibilities of redevelopment, but in Baltimore City, redevelopment became
another expression of residential segregation.
Racial tension exploded onto the national landscape in the summer of 1967. Large
sections of Newark, Detroit and Cleveland were devastated by civil disturbances in July
with similar disturbances reaching from Milwaukee and Memphis to Cambridge on
Maryland’s Eastern Shore. In response to mounting civil unrest since riots first began in
1965 with the Watts Riot in Los Angeles, the Division Streets Riots of 1966 in Chicago
and the 1967 Newark Riots, President Lyndon Johnson appointed the Kerner
Commission on July 28, 1967 to investigate “[t]he origins of the recent major civil
disorders in our cities. The Kerner Study focused on the basic causes and factors leading
to such disorders,” and proposed “methods and techniques for averting or controlling
such disorders,” including "[t]he appropriate role of the local, state and Federal
authorities.”169 The Commission was composed of eleven members: Otto Kerner,
Governor of Illinois, John Lindsay, Mayor of New York, Edward Brooke, Massachusetts
Republican Senator, Fred Harris Oklahoma Democratic Senator, James Corman,
California Democratic Congressman, William McCulloh, Ohio Republican Congressman,
Charles Thornton, founder of defense contractor Litton Industries, Roy Wilkins,
Executive Director of the NAACP, I.W. Abel, President of US Steelworkers of
American, Herbert Jenkins, Police Chief in Atlanta, and Katherine Peden, Kentucky
Commissioner of Commerce. Nine months later the National Advisory Commission on
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Civil Disorders released its controversial findings on the causes of the riots and its
recommendations for the future on February 29, 1968.
The report berated federal and state governments for failed housing, education
and social services policy. The commission believed that white racism, exemplified by
symbols of white authority such as the police, was both the cause and remedy of civil
disorder. Furthermore, white society was responsible for the creation of the ghetto, “What
white Americans have never fully understood – but what the Negro can never forget – is
that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white
institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.”170 The report declared, “our
nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal.”171 It
continued, “Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the movement and
deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of
American life; they now threaten the future of every American.”172 This statement may
have been prophetic for some but for those living in Baltimore, the intimate relationship
between race and residential segregation was a long forgone conclusion.
By the late 1960s Baltimore had long ago begun to feel the impacts of residential
segregation. Black neighborhoods were severely overcrowded, high rates of
unemployment and poverty followed. Black leaders voiced their grievances about
conditions in black neighborhoods. Floyd McKissick, the leader of CORE in the mid
1960s, explained, “We tried to warn the nation about the problems of the cities but they
didn’t heed it.”173 Around the time of the riots CORE began changing its mission from
integrationist to separatist, focusing on building up the black community by supporting
black businesses in the ghetto, for example McKissick explained, “lately… the cry for
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‘black power’ has become one for ‘black control’ of ghetto areas and institutions.”174
CORE’s message mirrored the desires of many black residents in Baltimore’s ghettos.
Demands to eliminate discrimination and exploitation by merchants, requests for more
vigorous protection by city agencies came alongside requests for public health and
housing code enforcement.175 The list of complaints continued: high prices and lower
quality foods than in middle-class white neighborhoods, exorbitant and deceptive credit
practices, inflated prices for liquor and appliances (commonly around 33% above
suburban prices), sale of used goods for new, evasion of warranties, fees for cashing
checks, refusal by banks to cash welfare checks, dishonest increasing of rents or
withholding of rent deposits, failure to make repairs in rental units, lack of proper heating
or plumbing. With such blatant disproportionate distribution of resources, services and
amenities in black ghettos, it is no wonder black residents did not respond earlier. After
the riots the Maryland Crime Investigating Commission issued a report detailing the
disturbances and postulating the conditions that bred the civil disorder. The commission
cited ignorance, apathy, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease and lack of opportunity
for decent jobs as causes of the riots.176 For Baltimore, the events of the mid 1960s
merely offered the black community a catalyst for expressing their mounting complaints.
The Kerner Commission’s report on the national civil disturbances hinged on two
related social movements: first, the migration of African Americans from the rural South
to the urban North and second, the subsequent departure of whites from Northern cities to
suburban enclaves. The report explained, “Almost all Negro population growth (98
percent from 1950 to 1966) is occurring within metropolitan areas, primarily within
central cities. The vast majority of white population growth (78 percent from 1960 to
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1966) is occurring in suburban portions of metropolitan areas. Since 1960, white centralcity population has declined by 1.3 million.”177 This national phenomenon was mirrored
in the case of Baltimore. Beginning in 1950 the population of white residents was
steadily declining. By 1970 the amount of black and white residents in Baltimore was
almost equal, a telling statistic considering up until 1940 white residents outnumbered
black residents 4:1(See Appendix 24). The commission attributed the creation and
maintenance of black inner cities surrounded by rings of white suburbia to white
institutions.
The Kerner Commission report accurately forecast the effects of these social
movements on urban housing. The report anticipated decreased housing opportunities
flowing from increased racial segregation. It observed, “Discrimination prevents access
to many non-slum areas, particularly the suburbs, and has a detrimental effect on ghetto
housing itself. By restricting the area open to a growing population, housing
discrimination makes it profitable for landlords to break up ghetto apartments for denser
occupancy, hastening housing deterioration.”178 Thus, the Kerner Commission was both
predicting characteristics of urban housing in the future and reiterating patterns that
existed since the beginning of the twentieth century.
The report urged measures to put a stop to de-facto segregation. But if these
policies were enforced by the state how could they be called “de-facto”? The case of
Baltimore speaks to the inadequacy of such facial distinctions as the federal government
and local agencies created and endorsed segregation policies well into the 1970s. The
Kerner Commission recommended re-investment in the inner cities, adequate housing, as
well as employment and recruitment of blacks in the media. The commission outlined the
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“Integration Choice” strategy in the framework of employment, education and housing.
The Commission’s strategy for housing was two-fold: First, it called for “a
comprehensive and enforceable federal open housing law to cover the sale or rental of all
housing, including single family homes.”179 To implement the law, the Commission
advised, “voluntary community action” to increase awareness about suburban housing
opportunities to urban minorities and to educate suburban communities about “the
desirability of open housing.”180 Second, the Commission urged an expansion of federal
housing programs that would create more low- and moderate-income units in suburban
areas, thus adding six million units to the federal low-income housing inventory by
1973.181
Despite the report’s comprehensive and accurate assessment of the issues
plaguing black inner city residents, the government did not pursue any of the
recommended solutions. Within a month after the Commission issued its report President
Johnson renounced a second Presidential term leading the way for Republican candidate
Richard Nixon to take office. During the years of his presidency the urban and poverty
programs of President Johnson’s administration gradually lost momentum and faded into
the history books.
In Baltimore, the initial reaction to King’s assassination was calm and the eve of
King’s assassination passed without incident. On Friday images of burning cities flashed
across televisions screens day and night. When the national rise in riots swept over
Baltimore, city officials to signed into action their plan for handling civil disorder known
as “Operation Oscar”.182 The Civil Defense agency developed Operation Oscar for
coordinating police, fire, transit, and health and welfare departments with private
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agencies like the Red Cross. On the same day Governor Agnew ordered the Maryland
National Guard on alert as a precautionary measure. Later that afternoon two fire
bombing incidents were reported to the police and at midnight the state police were put
on alert.
Some believe it was Governor Agnew’s address to Baltimore on Saturday
morning that spurred the civil disobedience. Gregory Kane, sixteen at the time of the riots
commented, “King was assassinated on a Thursday. That Saturday, when things were still
calm here in Baltimore, Agnew went on the air for a special announcement. I knew
immediately what he was going to say. ‘Don't do it, guv,’ I pleaded. ‘Just don't do it.’ But
he did, complimenting Baltimore's black community on our ‘good behavior.’ As if being
commended for being ‘good Negroes’ was what we wanted to hear at just that moment. It
wasn't.”183 Whether it was because of Governor Agnew’s words, or years of built up
tension and frustration, the riots began later that day. On Saturday afternoon word
reached City Hall that people were distributing pamphlets along Gay Street demanding
that business close in honor of Dr. King. Similar demands had preceded Washington’s
riot. Civil Disobedience struck Baltimore City at 5:30 pm on April 6, 1968 when the first
rock was thrown on Gay Street.184 The rioting began in East Baltimore and spread
westward over the next three days (see Appendix 22). A crowd of young black men was
rushing through the Gay Street area of East Baltimore and broke a store window. R.B.
Jones recalled, “…All hell broke loose. They started looting stores, going north along
Gay Street. The first fire started at the Lewis Furniture store on Gay Street.”185 Shortly
thereafter the police became flooded with reports of window smashing. An hour after the
first incident a looting was reported at a cleaning store on Gay Street followed by a fire at
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a paint store on the same street. Police officers, many wearing riot helmets, arrived on the
scene and attempted to disperse the crowds by driving slowly into the group of boys. At
8pm on Friday Governor Agnew declared a state of emergency as a precautionary
measure.
Mayor Thomas J. D’Alesandro III believed the assassination of Martin Luther
King caused the city to explode, “I don’t think that a large segment of the population
knew how bad it was in those [black] neighborhoods, how deep the problems were. Jobs,
housing, all the essentials for life were missing down there…”186 The Mayor’s
description of the black communities as “down there” illustrates white Baltimore’s
perception of the black ghettos as another world.
Reports of looting and fires from Gay Street and from neighborhoods in West
Baltimore continued late into the night. One Baltimore Reporter recalled driving up to
East North Avenue where several buildings were already ablaze, “I saw kids racing along
the sidewalk and carrying burning torches. We turned south on Harford Road, where a
big dry cleaning plant was already in ruins. No police or firemen were in sight. All this in
daylight.”187 The first death occurred at 10pm on Saturday April 6th when a suspected
looter was shot by…. The National Guard was called into East Baltimore and a curfew
was imposed on the entire city at 10pm. Liquor sales were banned and gasoline sales
were restricted. By midnight thousands of guardsmen and hundreds of police officers
patrolled the streets. General George Gelston, Adjutant of the National Guard declared
the situation to be under control.
The curfew was lifted at 6am on Sunday morning only to be followed by more
lootings and fires across the city including the first major riot-related fire in West
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Baltimore. In the early afternoon police barricaded the main downtown business and
shopping area. Like housing policy in Baltimore City, the police approach was to fortify
white spaces and contain black ones. Crowds of young black males were charging
through the streets of East and West Baltimore leaving a path of destruction in their
wake. Fires, looting, stoning of policemen and police cars as well as sniping increased
throughout the day. At 4pm on Sunday the curfew was reestablished and at 6pm
Governor Agnew requested the aid of Federal troops. Almost 5,000 soldiers arrived at
10:30pm on Sunday night adding to the 5,700 National Guardsmen already present.
The destruction continued through Monday and Tuesday but remained restricted
to black ghetto neighborhoods in east and west Baltimore. Census data shows that the
concentration of violence was located in predominantly black neighborhoods across
Baltimore City (see Appendix 23). Police broke up a confrontation between white and
black crowds on Monday and by Wednesday the violence subsided. By Friday the curfew
and liquor bans were lifted and the Federal troops and National Guard left. Governor
Agnew declared the state of emergency ended on 10am Sunday, April 14. The final toll
tallied 6 killed, 600 injured, 1200 fires, 1100 businesses damaged by fires, vandalism
and/or looting and property damages were estimated between $8 and $13.5 million.188
Melvin Williams, who became infamous as a Baltimore drug kingpin, witnessed
the riots of 1968. Williams observed that most of the black businesses on Baltimore’s
west side remained untouched but businesses belonging to whites were looted and
burned.189 The report issued by the Maryland Crime Investigating Commission on the
riots came to the same conclusion as Melvin Williams. The Commission found that
burning and looting were purposely restricted to black ghettos and that the riot was
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tightly organized and precisely executed. The Commission purported that the black
militants were not trying to start a race riot but instead were “trying to establish
machinery whereby the Negroes were run their own neighborhood stores. The first phase
of the plan was to burn out the white merchants.”190 This report is consistent with the idea
that in Baltimore Martin Luther King’s assassination provided the needed catalyst for the
black community to air their grievances and route out the negative white influence over
black neighborhoods. In a report issued by the American Friends Service Committee on
the Baltimore civil disorders, author Jane Motz concluded, “The Baltimore story is not
one of black against black. It is an expression of black people’s anger at the instruments
and symbols of white exploitation and oppression.”191 Thus, the riots were not intended
as acts of aggression against whites, but rather to take control away from white store and
business owners in their own communities. Thomas A. Ward, a retired Circuit Court
Judge, recalled, “vengeance was being directed against the physical symbols of white
control, no matter if they were the local grocery store or coin laundry, or the apartment
whose landlord wouldn’t fix the leaky roof. A passing white person was not the
enemy.”192 White Baltimoreans walked through the streets without consequence.
Baltimore was spared the high toll of lost lives and civic guilt and anger that were
experienced by Newark and Detroit because law enforcement officers were under strict
orders to refrain from use of their guns. National Guardsmen carried live ammunition but
their rifles were unloaded. Troops were instructed only to shoot if fired on and then only
on orders of an officer or if the target was unmistakably a sniper and there was no danger
of bystanders being involved. In later reports General Gelston claimed that only one
Guardsman fired one round of ammunition over the head of a suspected looter.
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Though most of the actions to deal with Baltimore’s troubles were directed at the
black population, some efforts were made to work with the black community. Black and
white groups tried to head off the trouble by holding memorial services and marches to
facilitate conversation and airing out of emotions in a non-violent manner.193 When
trouble began on Saturday, leaders of several activist groups like CORE, the Civic
Interest Group (CIG) and the Union for Jobs or Income Now (U-JOIN) took to the streets
to redirect the outburst and minimize damage. Some representatives of the Baltimore
government such as the head of the Community Relations Committee and representatives
from the Mayors office also attempted to minimize the damage as it happened.194
The official attitude towards black activists was mixed. Mayor D’Alesandro
contacted the CIG for help on Saturday while General Gelston tried to communicate
openly with young black militants, some of whom were members of groups like CORE
and others who were just black ghetto residents. Both the Mayor and the General issued
passes to militant leaders permitting them to be on the strees after curfew. However once
federal troops took over these passes were not recognized. An afternoon peace meeting,
which had been authorized by Baltimore City Police, was broken up by troops wearing
gas masks. On the whole efforts to assuage or redirect violent anger were uncoordinated
and ineffective.195
Days after the riots Governor Spiro T. Agnew met with a selected group of
Baltimore civil rights leaders in an attempt to create a dialogue between the government
and local authorities. Instead, however, the purpose of Governor Agnew’s speech seemed
to be accusation,“…you know who the fires burned out just as you know who lit the fires.
They were not lit in honor of your great leader. Nor were they lit from an overwhelming
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sense of frustration and despair. Those fires were kindled at the suggestion and with the
instruction of the advocates of violence.”196 In his speech Governor Agnew suggested
that black power activist Stokely Carmichael had planted the seeds of civil disobedience
in the minds of local civil rights leaders. “It is no mere coincidence,” Governor Agnew
said, “that a national disciple of violence, Mr. Stokely Carmichael, was observed meeting
with local black power advocates and known criminals in Baltimore on April 3, 1968 –
three days before the Baltimore riots began.”197 This accusation was met with fierce
opposition and defense. Walter Lively, director of the Baltimore Urban Coalition and
head of U-JOIN commented, “Governor Agnew is trying to find a scapegoat… instead of
facing the fact that the problems existed before and helped ferment the energies that
caused the disturbance.”198
In addition to accusing Stokely Carmichael Governor Agnew made a mockery of
the Kerner Commissions pointed conclusions stating, “If our nation is not to move toward
two separate societies – one white and one black – you have an obligation too… I call
upon you to publicly repudiate, condemn and reject all black racists.”199 The Governor’s
conclusion shows his misunderstanding of the matter at hand and misdirected blame. A
black minister from Douglas Memorial Church commented on Governor Agnew’s racist
statements saying, “…we found that the governor’s apparent intent was to divide the
black community… Agnew’s actions are more in keeping with the slave system of a
bygone era.” The minister also berated the governor for refusing to meet with students of
Bowie College to resolve problems at their school and for refusing to close State offices
to honor the memory of Dr. Martin Luther King. Walter Lively, director of U-JOIN,
spoke on behalf of Baltimore’s black community explaining, “the actions of the last
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several days clearly indicate that an overwhelming portion of the black community of this
city do not want the white man to continue his economic colonization of our people.”200 It
is clear that Governor Agnew’s attempt to create an open dialogue between Baltimore
civil rights leaders failed. Instead his views reflected a failure on the part of white city
officials to understand the issues facing the black community in Baltimore.
Baltimore’s official response to the riots was relatively weak. City banks agreed
to cash welfare checks without charge and to extend their hours. Inspection agencies
became more diligent in checking practices of merchants in the ghetto. Some efforts were
made to confront the issues raised through the riots. On Sunday April 14 religious leaders
in Baltimore led a “Procession of Penance” as a confession of shared guilt for white
racism and a pledge of support for the ideals of Martin Luther King. A month later two
seminars were held at Loyola College to explore the racial crisis in Baltimore. A series of
meetings under the title “what color is power?” was sponsored by eight white upper
middle class churches in North Baltimore.201
More than forty years after the riots, empty lots, abandoned store fronts, and
vacant homes encompass Baltimore’s downtown as a result of the 1968 riots. Despite the
obvious reminders of the riots, many Baltimoreans still do not connect the disinvestment
in the inner city and lack of small businesses to the decisions Baltimore families and local
officials made as a result of the riots; whereby redevelopment continued the legacy of
racial segregation and black community neglect.
It is difficult to draw concrete conclusions on the effects of the riots for the urban
and geophysical landscape of Baltimore City. Though initial response to the riots was
decline and despair, it was soon followed by a period of rebirth. More public health and
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social services, new schools, more subsidized housing, increased public and private
employment of blacks and increased political representations are among the positive
outcomes of the riots of 1968. However, there were negative repercussions of the riots as
well. More and more citizens, white and black, withdrew to the outskirts of the city as the
poverty, crime and social ills associated with the black ghetto spread across the city. Even
ten years after, one Sun reporter concluded that the riots “aroused fears which have only
partially diminished [ten years later],” citing an increased unemployment rate, increased
dependency on public welfare, and difficulty emerging from the hold of the black
ghetto.202 The Baltimore Sun reflected on changes within Baltimore City. “Many of the
inner city areas hit hardest by the rioting had been scheduled for slum clearance… the
realization of urban renewal plans in the intervening years has transformed large areas of
the inner city.”203 The most dramatic changes took place in West Baltimore along
Pennsylvania Avenue. Dingy bars and over 1,300 rapidly deteriorating dwellings were
razed and replaced with 1,360 new dwelling units. Additional public facilities such as
schools, health centers, parks, recreation and community centers were built for both black
and white residents who moved into the newly rehabilitated Pennsylvania Avenue.
None of the new construction following the riots of 1968, however, was meant to
be low-income housing. Purchasing a new home constructed in urban renewal areas cost
as much as $29,000 while rents ranged from $150 for a one-bedroom apartment to $350
for a four-bedroom townhouse. This resulted in the permanent displacement of many
poor people who once lived in the urban renewal areas because prices of new homes were
not equivalent to previous home values and thus excluded the old neighborhood
residents.204 In 1978 one in four Baltimore families were estimated to be living in
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substandard housing with 12,000 families on the waiting list for public housing. Almost
every black neighborhood was cited as having been affected by the displacement of over
9,700 families by urban renewal and expressway projects. A black Howard Park
businessman explained, “if you tear down one slum, all you do is create another slum.
That’s what’s happening around here...”205 Throughout Baltimore slums were destroyed
to make way for new construction. Because homes were not built for displaced black
residents they were again forced to crowd together in areas with already high black
concentration. Again, overcrowding and poverty bred social ills in black ghettos. Slum
clearance, even under the agenda of urban renewal, did not solve the problem of blight
and slum conditions – it merely moved it from one black neighborhood to another.
In the 1960s Baltimore City officials made plans to extend Route I-70 in
Baltimore and connect it with the nearby Baltimore Beltway. Plans were to extend the
highway across the harbor with a sixteen-lane bridge in order to connect it with I-95.206
The East-West Expressway would lead through Leakin Park and many other historic and
predominantly black neighborhoods. Construction began in West Baltimore destroying a
20 blocks of houses and communities along Franklin and Mulberry Streets displacing
thousands of families. Plans were halted in the early 1970s when activists protested the
imminent destruction of historic districts like Federal Hill, along the inner harbor, and
Fells Point. Only now, forty years later, are plans being proposed to demolish the
“Highway to Nowhere”. The Highway to Nowhere represents the destruction of a stable
black community for an abandoned urban renewal project. In writing for the Baltimore
Sun Kelly Jaques remarked, “In many ways, the highway plans and the riots were linked.
To the people who lived in the neighborhoods slated for clearance, the expressway
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proposals made it clear their homes and schools and luncheonettes and grocery stores
were less important than an exit ramp. Public policy declared over and over again that
Baltimore's black neighborhoods were disposable; in 1968 rioters treated them
accordingly,”207 In Baltimore, alongside other racially contentious urban contexts, “urban
renewal” was interchangeable with “urban removal”. As with previous segregationist
agendas, urban renewal projects had no qualms about destroying black communities to
make way for “improvements” that would maintain or increase the land values of white
spaces while being primarily used by white residents.
Fifteen years after the riots the Baltimore Sun published an article highlighting the
surge in construction following the riots. Pennsylvania Avenue, once a main street of
black West Baltimore, was badly torched but later the lower portion was replaced by new
housing for the elderly, churches and community centers. On the East Side of Baltimore,
Gay Street was resurrected as the Oldtown Mall, a two block pedestrian shopping mall,
and a new location for public housing. While the riots changed the physical landscape of
many streets of Baltimore, they also sped up the process of white flight. Before the riots,
two sears stores were the retail centers of black Baltimore with white consumers utilizing
the shopping centers as well. After the riots, however, white shoppers and some retailers
abandoned Howard Street for the suburbs. The riots helped speed commercial flight from
black America. The Baltimore Bullets basketball team fled Baltimore to suburban
Washington. Mayor Thomas J. D’Alesandro III, once cheerful at the prospect of his
position, became anxious to see his position end.
The Sun credited Mayor William Donald Schaefer, Baltimore’s hometown boy,
for guiding Baltimore back to a place of optimism and hope after the riots. After taking
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office in 1971, Mayor Schaefer was credited for the expansion and revitalization of the
Inner Harbor, bringing the Blast soccer team to Baltimore and reopening some of the
city’s historic theaters. However, fifteen years after the riots much of the physical
damage blended into pre-existing decay. Declining black ghettos, the primary sites of the
riots, were often condemned to further deterioration as urban renewal agendas again
focused only on those areas in between white and black neighborhoods. Baltimore of
1983 boasted an integrated workplace though a still largely segregated residence.208
Development of the inner harbor came on the heels of the riots. At the turn of the
twentieth century Baltimore’s inner harbor was a bustling center. A center of commerce
and industry, merchants lined the piers selling their wares and department stores for
whites encircled the water (See Appendix 29). The harbor was home to many large
shipping companies that were the chief employers of newly migrated black residents.
Thus, the area immediately surrounding the harbor was home to many blacks in the years
leading up to the turn of the century. Blacks lived in historical “alley houses” which were
characterized by their narrow size and close proximity. After the Baltimore Fire in 1904
however, much of downtown, including the inner harbor, was decimated. What used to
be a bustling center where merchants, businessmen, and black migrants came to work
became home to rats and rotting piers. The dingy inner harbor waterfront, once the
vibrant center of Baltimore, stood as a deserted reminder of what downtown Baltimore
once was. After the fire, Baltimore’s shipping industry moved to Locust Point southwest
of the inner harbor and towards Dundalk in southeast Baltimore. While businesses and
industry left downtown Baltimore, blacks were largely restricted to the now slowly
deteriorating alley houses. Black residents crowded together in the small row houses
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surrounding the harbor in conditions that bred disease. “Blight” was soon characterized in
racial terms, as the city’s worst slum conditions were located surrounding the inner
harbor where most black residents lived.
By the 1920s and 1930s these areas were slated for slum clearance as Baltimore
City officials sought means to remove blight and force the black population outward. In
1921 Mayor Broening appointed seven members, both city officials and private citizens,
to the Baltimore Zoning Commission. The Commission was charged with the duty of
preparing a comprehensive zoning plan for Baltimore. By placing the downtown central
business district surrounding the inner harbor within the First Commercial District
category, planners secured the region’s commercial future. Furthermore, the Mayor, City
Council and Zoning Board were given broad power to make choices determining the use
of the zoned areas adding a political dimension to zoning.209 By zoning the inner harbor
area as commercial and covering black spaces in restrictive covenants, a buffer was
created between the harbor and surrounding Black residences. Segregation ordinances
and restrictive covenants barred blacks from housing opportunity forcing them again to
crowd together in sections of the city that were already predominantly black. But even
once blacks moved away from the inner harbor, the waterfront remained a ghost town
until the urban renewal agenda of the 1950s and 1960s prompted planners to rebuild the
deteriorating harbor.
After World War II Baltimore’s central business district suffered from a $50
million decline in the value of downtown property.210 The city’s business community
banned together and created a Committee for Downtown to raise private funds for the
preparation of a master plan that would be the basis for reversing the decline. The task
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was handed down to the Planning Council of the Greater Baltimore Committee. Halfway
through planning, however, the business leaders concluded that their original plan to
revitalize the entire 300-acre business district might be too ambitious so they downsized
and focused the project on 22 acres. This plan developed into the $140 million Charles
Center Project.211
Mayor Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr. acquired a $25 million city bond issue and
helped push through the urban renewal ordinance needed to issue power of eminent
domain to begin the project. Though Baltimore could not find the funds to build housing
for displaced residents subjected to slum clearance as a part of urban renewal, Mayor
D’Alesandro had no problem acquiring public funds to revitalize and rebuild an area
meant to attract white upper class consumers and residents. The cornerstone of the
project, One Charles Center, was designed by Mies van der Rohe and completed in
1962.212 By 1963 three more structures were completed and six were in the planning
stages including two office buildings, a hotel, department store, theater and underground
garage. The speed and success of the Charles Center Project inspired the public and
private sector to take on redevelopment of the downtown waterfront.
Mayor Theodore R. McKeldin set the plan for waterfront redevelopment in
motion. The plan had three facets: first, a row of office buildings along Pratt Street facing
the waterfront, second, multifamily housing along the eastern and western edges of the
waterfront, and third, in the center, a public playground for Baltimoreans along the
shoreline of the Inner Harbor (See Appendix 30). One third of the planning area would be
razed and rebuilt and the remaining two thirds, including city hall and the financial
district, would be rehabilitated.213
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Under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 Baltimore officials leveled all of
Baltimore’s downtown high-rise public housing to make way for inner harbor
development. Five thousand housing units were demolished. Under Title I urban renewal
projects that eliminated residential structures had to compensate by creating new
residences on a 1:1 ratio with the eliminated structures. However, this provision was
rarely followed and no regulations stipulated that low-income housing had to be replaced
with similarly priced alternatives. In downtown Baltimore public housing units were
replaced by 3,200 luxury high-rise and townhouse units. Thus by the 1960s, the urban
renewal agenda in Baltimore became identified with socio-economic status as
redevelopment was catered to the upper class. Those displaced by the development of the
inner harbor were forced to find alternatives in poor neighborhoods with high
concentrations of vacancy and crime.214
Developers projected the timeline of the project to last thirty years but it was
ultimately accomplished in twenty. In 1969 work began on attracting businesses to the
office buildings that would be built on Pratt Street. USF&G insurance, a native company
of Baltimore, was the first to step forward with a proposal to build a 36-story tower at the
focal point of the Inner Harbor – the intersection of Pratt and Light streets. IBM, the
Federal Reserve Bank, the C&P Telephone Company, Equitable Trust Bank and the
Federal Courts soon followed suit.215 Three years later the Maryland board of public
works approved the construction of a 28-story World Trade Center.
In 1972 Mayer William Donald Schaefer came into office and took over the Inner
Harbor redevelopment plan. By this time, previous urban renewal plans aimed at inner
city development were abandoned. City officials believed inner harbor redevelopment,
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which was meant to attract white consumers and eventually upper class white residence,
was more important. Building an attractive inner harbor would stimulate commerce and
industry thus, creating an epicenter of white consumption and residence. This end had the
added benefit of pushing black ghetto neighborhoods to the east and west of the center of
the city. By 1973 work began on the public park that was to overlook the harbor. The
shoreline around the Inner Harbor basin was rebuilt, the streets were redesigned as wide
boulevards, and a multi lane highway was built outward from inner harbor connecting to
I-95 thereby enclosing historic Federal Hill and limiting foot traffic from neighborhoods
to the southwest of the inner harbor. A 35-foot-wide promenade was also added to the
water’s edge. This promenade not only served to designate the harbor as a recreational
space, but also created a border between the gentrified inner harbor and the black
neighborhoods that surrounded it. Only the second facet of the plan, housing, had not
been realized by the 1970s. The city’s Department of Housing and Community
Development (HCD) adopted a new “homesteading” program for the Otterbein
neighborhood to the west of the Inner Harbor. Through this program the HCD offered
dilapidated row houses for $1 each to local residents who would agree to restore and live
in them. The 150 units were renovated for an average of $50,000 each in borrowed
funding based on credit rating. Black residents were inherently excluded from this deal
because it was not announced publicly.216 Through this program Otterbein became one of
the trendier neighborhoods in downtown Baltimore, home to artists, musicians and
performers.
In 1975 construction of the Maryland Science Center was underway with plans to
build an aquarium and convention center. Between 1979 and 1981 four major attractions
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were completed along the Inner Harbor: the Baltimore Convention Center was completed
in 1979, the National Aquarium in Baltimore opened in 1981, the Hyatt Regency opened
in 1981 and finally the festival marketplace known as Harborplace, built by worldfamous Baltimore developer James Rouse, opened in the Inner Harbor on July 4, 1980.217
The opening of James Rouse’s harbor pavilion in 1980 marked the beginning of
gentrification in southwest Baltimore.
Development of the Inner Harbor continues to this day. As of 2000 more than 60
new projects were built or rehabilitated: 15 office buildings, 12 hotels, ten museums and
17 other attractions plus a subway station have been built in the last ten years. The Inner
Harbor project also continues to stretch its boundaries beyond the waterfront. To the
North Rouse Company added a 1.2 million square foot mixed use Gallery project, to the
South the American Visionary Art Museum and to the west Oriole Park at Camden Yards
has extended the pedestrian area that the Inner Harbor has become.218
Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, once considered home to blight, disease and poverty,
now houses world-class attractions and serves as a revitalized and rehabilitated urban
center. The alley houses, once thought only suitable for black residence, now sell for
upwards of two million dollars. Inner harbor revitalization has expanded towards
immigrant neighborhoods of east Baltimore, displacing residents in favor of trendy
apartment buildings inhabited by post-college graduates. The riots of 1968 marked the
beginning of late twentieth century urban renewal projects across Baltimore City.
Development of the waterfront and downtown Baltimore began to bring white residents
back into downtown and initiated a larger movement of gentrification in the city.
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As Baltimore officials continue to build on the success of the inner harbor
revitalization projects that began in the 1970s, more and more residents are being
displaced to make way for commercial and residential redevelopment meant to attract
upper class white residents. I-83 once trickled into downtown Baltimore with a view of
an abandoned waterfront composed of old warehouses and abandoned row houses in the
1990s. Today, entering the city from the suburbs one is greeted by a magnificent gold
fountain surrounded by Roy’s Hawaiian Fusion, a Marriot Courtyard Hotel and a large
Whole Foods Market. Boutiques and loft apartments surround the waterfront serving as a
reminder that the Baltimore planning agenda will always favor the white or at least
relatively affluent consumer. Former residents of the new waterfront redevelopment have
again been pushed out of downtown Baltimore into East and West Baltimore. Today, one
can see a pocket of white residence surrounding the inner harbor and waterfront to the
east with densely populated black neighborhoods encircling downtown Baltimore.
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Chapter 5
Under the Wire: Mapping the History of Residential Segregation Baltimore

On the surface Baltimore appears to be just another large, decaying Eastern city,
having experienced population decline, out migration of commerce and industry, an
expanding black minority, rise in social problems, and general deterioration. Many would
assume a cause and effect connection between Baltimore’s simultaneous black inmigration and white flight. However this explanation, combined with Baltimore’s
national image in popular culture, has done a disservice to the complex history of
Baltimore’s past. Underneath images of the most visible social ills known for destroying
America’s cities, Baltimore City has played host to and been shaped by a much more
enduring and many times legal vice: segregation.
Close examination reveals that Baltimore’s narrative is more than just symbolic of
the decline of American cities; Baltimore’s story reflects racial investment and
divestment policies with the intent of shaping Baltimore into a racially segregated city.
The urban landscape of Baltimore is a history book, a readable narrative of the gradual
creation of a segregated city. The result of a one hundred year long residential
segregation agenda can be seen in census maps depicting the changing racial dispersion
across Baltimore City. Today, Baltimore is defined by two islands of densely populated
black residence in East and West Baltimore divided and surrounded by white settlement.
The two Baltimore’s that exist in 2010, one white and one black, are a result of racially
motivated policies and practices that began with the segregation ordinances of 1910.
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In 1910 Baltimore was predominantly white. Of the city’s half-a-million residents
only 15% were black. Black residents were concentrated in the downtown business
district near shipyards and docks where most black Baltimore residents worked at the
turn of the century while and white residents formed a ring around them. In the last
hundred years Baltimore’s population demographic has changed dramatically and the
white ring has returned. In 2010 Baltimore’s population totaled 637,418. Of that number,
33% of city residents are white and 67% of residents are black. This dramatic change in
the composition of the city’s population reflects the persistent imposition of measures to
segregate the city based on race. Though residential segregation began with the first
segregation ordinances to be seen in the United States in 1910, the city government and
residents enacted residential segregation through public and private action over the last
one hundred years.
Although black residents only made up 15% of Baltimore’s total population of
558,485 in 1910, (See Appendix 24) whites residents alleged an “encroachment” of
black residents into predominantly white neighborhoods. The first recorded attempt by a
black family to move into a predominantly white neighborhood prompted private citizens
to pressure local Baltimore officials to impose restrictions on the proximity of black
residence to white residence. The introduction of residential segregation ordinances in
1910 helps explain a future of residential isolation and confinement for black residents of
Baltimore City.
Once the Supreme Court struck down residential segregation ordinances in 1917,
restrictive covenants became a new instrument of racial separation. White residents
sought protection from black intrusion through deeds that barred blacks from buying or

93

occupying real estate in a prescribed block or multi-block radius. In 1925, Carl and
Matilda Schoenrodt filed a covenant along with twenty-six homeowners on their agreeing
that:
“None of the said respective properties nor any part of them shall at any time be
occupied or used by or conveyed, mortgaged, leased, rented or given to any Negro
or to any person or persons in whole or in part of Negro or African descent.
Persons of negro or African descent may be employed as servants by any of the
owners or occupant of said respective property and whilst so employed may
reside in said premises as servants as long as the premises are occupied by their
respective employers.”219
The covenant above protected Appleton Street, to the west of Fulton Street, which in
1940 census maps is clearly inhabited by white residents (See Appendix 9). In Maryland,
a Court of Appeals ruling in 1938 against a black man who had moved to a white
Baltimore block a year earlier strengthened enforcement of restrictive covenants. The
house was within a twenty-four-square block area that white residents had protected by a
covenant written in 1926. The legality of restrictive covenants was upheld until 1948. In
Maryland, racially restrictive covenants were used across the city but West Baltimore, at
the border of Fulton Street, and North Baltimore were subject to covenants in particular.
Edward Bouton built Roland Park in North Baltimore, under a restrictive covenant with
the intent of creating Baltimore’s first elite, white, and upper class neighborhood.
By 1930 black citizens made up almost 20% of Baltimore’s 804,874 city residents
yet there were confined to only 2% of the city’s land area. In 1933 Baltimore’s HOLC
office opened with 14 white men as part of the Home Owners’ Refinancing Act
introduced as part of New Deal legislation by President Roosevelt.220 The HOLC was
charged with assessing neighborhoods and dividing them into real estate risk categories,
adding a cartographic dimension to the pathology of race in America and residential
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segregation. “Redlining,” dictated the current value and future prospects of a
neighborhood based on categories including the racial composition of the area. As one
might imagine, neighborhoods that were predominantly black received the lowest rating
and were marked in red (hence the term “redlining”). Comparing the 1940s census tract
map to the redlining map issued by Baltimore’s HOLC one sees a clear correspondence
to race: the ring surrounding downtown is shaded red and surrounded by yellow (the
second worst rating a neighborhood could be given) (See Appendix 1). The Census tract
map similarly shows a concentration of black residents surrounding downtown to both
the east and west of the central business district near the waterfront. The more favorable
neighborhoods as noted by the HOLC’s map extended to the northwest and northeast of
the city where we can see, when comparing the 1940s census map, less than 5% of the
residents were white or black (See Appendix 9).
In 1940 Baltimore’s population swelled to 859,100 composed of 692,705 white
residents and 166,395 black residents. Although whites still outnumbered blacks 81% to
19% the number of black residents was steadily increasing (See Appendix 24). Census
maps showing racial dispersion across the city illustrate two distinct islands of black
residence: one on the east side of downtown and one on the west side of downtown (See
Appendix 9). Today, these two islands have become a defining characteristic of
Baltimore’s identity. Black residents in East Baltimore were bounded to the north and
south by North Avenue and Fleet Street and to the east and west by Wolfe Street and Gay
Street. Black residences in West Baltimore were bounded by Fulton Ave to the East,
North Ave, Pratt Street and Gay Street. By 1940 the area surrounding the downtown
business district and inner harbor was more than 30% black according to census data.
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Although black residents occupied large sections of downtown Baltimore in the 1940’s
one can see from the maps that a dividing line runs down the center of the city along
Calvert and Gay Streets. This line, which is still visible in census maps of 2010, relegated
black residents to either side of the central business district.
The 1940s brought the first construction of low-income housing projects to
Baltimore City. Early site selection criteria required builders to respect the racial makeup of a neighborhood when determining where a project was to be built, resulting in a
reinforcement of existing racial residence patterns. The first low-income projects built in
Baltimore was Edgar Allen Poe Homes designated for black residents and located deep in
the heart of West Baltimore. Latrobe Homes, was located just north of downtown and
was designated for white use, while McCulloh and Douglass Homes were built for black
residents and located in West Baltimore and north of the harbor respectively. Perkins,
Fairfield, Brooklyn, Westport, and Gilmor Homes were built 1942, while O’Donnell
Heights, Somerset Courts were built in 1943 and finally Cherry Hill Homes was built in
1945 (See Appendix 32).221 As the Fair Housing Act was not passed until 1949,
Baltimore housing officials were able to designate projects for all white or black
occupancy.
The first housing projects in Baltimore City were built on areas slated for slum
clearance to make way for new construction. Black citizens were displaced as a result of
slum clearance projects while new projects provided homes for only a fraction of the
displaced black homeowners. Thus, black residents were again forced to crowd together
perpetuating slum conditions that Baltimore City officials attempted to assuage through
slum clearance projects.
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Ever since the 1910 segregation ordinances the western boundary of black
residence was marked by Fulton Street. In 1944 the first black resident broke the
boundary moving beyond Fulton Street thus pushing the barrier of black residence
westward.222 The Fulton Street barrier was defeated by blockbusters who saw an
opportunity to capitalize on white fears of depreciating home values and other social ills
they perceived to follow black residence. For the next sixty years black residents would
continue to expand westward pushing whites beyond the city limits and out into the
county. Maps showing racial composition and population of Baltimore City from 19301970 illustrate the drastic westward expansion of Baltimore’s black population. Once the
floodgates of Fulton Street were opened black residents poured into West Baltimore with
unprecedented speed.223 Comparing census maps of 1940 to present day estimates one
can see the westward expansion of black residents beyond Baltimore City limits (See
Appendix 9 and Appendix 16). Furthermore, the 1948 Supreme Court held that racially
restrictive covenants were unenforceable thus compelling West Baltimore residents to
abolish covenants that had barred black residents from westward expansion.
The 1950s brought more black residents into Baltimore City. Baltimore’s total
population grew to a record high 949,708 city residents. Of almost 1 million city
residents 723,675 were white and 226,053 were black (See Appendix 24). Census maps
show black residents crowding around the downtown business district leaving only a
pocket of white residences immediately north of the inner harbor. It is no coincidence
that these same primarily black residential areas were designated as “blighted” according
to the study published by the Baltimore City Housing Authority in 1950 Baltimore’s
Blighted Areas (See Appendix 4). Overcrowded dwelling units, substandard sanitation,
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and high incidences of disease defined blight. These characteristics defined black
neighborhoods surrounding downtown but not white neighborhoods. Blacks tended to be
confined to second-class homes because the real estate market shaped by restrictive
covenants permitted owners to raise the rental price of a home for blacks. Thus, blacks
were forced to squeeze more families into a space meant for far fewer people. Whites
were able to escape the ailments of black “blighted” areas because the real estate market
permitted them to move out overcrowded homes, they had access to better education, and
employment opportunities. In contrast, black residents were hemmed into overcrowded
neighborhoods by lack of employment opportunities, racist real estate practices and a
lack of educational opportunity. Many of the areas outlined in this study were slated for
slum clearance and as sites for low-income housing projects. Through the plethora of
studies like Baltimore’s Blighted Areas city officials intrinsically labeled “blight” as a
racial characteristic.
The 1950s and 1960s brought the issue of race and segregation to the forefront of
American consciousness with the advent of landmark court decisions like Brown v.
Board of Education and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Though tensions were high in
many parts of the country, in Baltimore local civil rights leaders engaged in open
dialogue with local city officials. However, Dr. Martin Luther King’s assassination in
1968 sparked rioting across the city. Rioters were predominantly black youths who
targeted stores and residences of white Baltimoreans. Maps comparing the locations of
rioting incidents and the racial make up of the area show that most incidents occurred in
predominantly black neighborhoods across east and west Baltimore (See Appendix 23).
Although the riots only lasted three days the impact on Baltimore City was felt for years
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to come. Though triggered by Dr. King’s assassination tensions regarding inadequate
housing, lack of public facilities and social services in black neighborhoods were
mounting and came to a head through the riots of 1968.
Baltimore’s black population continued to push westward in the 1960s.
Unfortunately census tract data is unavailable for this decade and thus corresponding
maps could not be created (See Appendix 11 for substitute maps). By 1970 Baltimore’s
population had declined by almost 50,000 residents. White residents fled to Baltimore
County where taxes were lower, schools were better and blacks were inherently excluded
due to higher property costs and racial steering and outright neighborhood
discouragement of black residents. Meanwhile the black population of Baltimore City
almost doubled in twenty years reaching 425,950 residents of a total 905,759 residents
(See Appendix 24). Black residents further stretched the boundaries of their isolation into
northeast Baltimore. Black population density increased in the areas immediately
surrounding downtown as areas north of downtown gentrified causing housing prices to
exclude blacks from the market.
In 1980 the composition of Baltimore’s population reached a turning point.
Despite perceptions of racial invasion in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s that drove urban
policy, Baltimore City did not become majority black until 1980. In 1980 the total
population of Baltimore City was 786,775, 43% white and 56% black (See Appendix 24).
Despite this shift in the composition of the population, blacks were still relegated to the
east and west of downtown Baltimore. According to scholars Douglas Massey and Nancy
Denton, by 1980 Baltimore was among sixteen metropolitan regions that were
“hypersegregated”.224 Baltimore ranked highest in the areas of centralization (“the extent
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to which blacks are spatially distributed close to, or far away from, the central business
district”) and concentration (“a measure of the relative amount of physical space
occupied by blacks within the metropolitan environment”).225 Census maps clearly show
this hypersegregation (See Appendix 13).
In 1995 African-American public housing residents backed by the American Civil
Liberties Union filed a class-action suit against the HUD and the Baltimore City Housing
Authority aimed at eliminating alleged racial segregation and discrimination in
Baltimore’s public housing units. The residents alleged that the Baltimore City Housing
Authority was perpetuating former de jure segregation through racially based
assignments of public housing applicants and through their site selection practices.226 The
parties agreed to some of the claims raised in the class action suit and an agreement was
reached in 1996 in the form of a Consent Decree thus affirming the charge that Baltimore
housing officials were in fact basing public housing assignments on race. The Consent
Decree imposed many obligations on the Baltimore City Housing Authority that
ultimately the Supreme Court found the Authority had not fulfilled. The Baltimore City
Housing Authority failed to make available 911 housing units (as opposed to rent
vouchers) in areas without high concentrations of minority residents or public housing.
When the case reached the Supreme Court in 2005 the Baltimore City Housing Authority
had only made 8 units available. Thompson v. HUD was decided in 2005 in favor of the
public housing residents and extended the timeline of the Consent Decree.
Racial segregation has always existed in Baltimore in a fine-tuned pattern
enforced by a combination of legal power, monetary clout and private action. Nineteenthcentury street and alley segregation gave way to ghettos in East, West and South
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Baltimore enforced by Jim Crow laws. As the process of segregation evolved the
confusion between poverty, black skin and the inner city became more insistent. Poverty
was perceived as criminal, contagious and immoral; the inner city was plagued with
tuberculosis, venereal disease and illegitimacy – the common denominator in the white
imagination was the black city resident. What was called “the Negro problem” in 1915
evolved into the “urban problem” in the 1960s and today is seen as the safety or even tax
base problem. Now at the turn of the twenty-first century “blight”, poverty and social
problems in Baltimore are still branded “black”. White residents are warned never to
enter the neighborhoods in West Baltimore that are almost 100% black because of the
perception that these neighborhoods are breeding grounds for drug abuse and trade,
violence and poverty. Unfortunately, some of these characteristics do exist in
predominantly black residential areas in Baltimore City. Census maps reflecting
population density and median income correspond to areas that are predominantly black
(See Appendix 21 and Appendix 17). 30-40% of the residents in areas comprised of 80%
or more black residents are living in poverty (See Appendix 20). Further correspondence
can be seen between high rates of unemployment, 15% or higher, and black residential
areas (See Appendix 19). These conditions are a symptom of residential segregation.
They are a manifestation of discrimination, exclusionary location policies of Baltimore
officials, and closed doors to housing, employment and community services. Residential
segregation, a practice intentionally and strategically implemented by private citizens and
local officials, is the common denominator in most of the social issues plaguing
Baltimore’s black residents.
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From 1910 to 2010 Baltimore’s black population increased from 85,098 to
402,721 while the amount of white residents in the city declined from 473,387 to 211,285
(See Appendix 24) This massive demographic shift, accompanied by drastic segregation
visible in the landscape of Baltimore City, is reflective of changes and challenges that
faced urban cities across the United States in the last hundred years. The creation of the
hypersegregated city that Baltimore is today began with residential segregation
ordinances in 1910, continued through slum clearance, restrictive covenants, redlining
and was confirmed with the site selection practices of Federal Public Housing. Racial
segregation subtly continues today within present day efforts at redevelopment. The
coordination of local and federal government action, in concert with private choice,
allowed local officials to pursue various methods to clear, consolidate and contain
Baltimore’s expanding black population.
The history of Baltimore’s segregation challenges long held assumptions about
the hard line between de jure and de facto segregation. It has been generally assumed that
segregation imposed by law, de jure, gives way to segregation that occurs in practice but
is not necessarily ordained by law, de facto. However Baltimore’s segregation history
contradicts this notion. After the first attempt by the local city council to impose
segregation by law was struck down, Baltimore officials found support for segregation
from federal policies. Rather than transitioning from government implementation to
private action, as has generally been imagined, Baltimore transitioned from segregation
imposed by a local body of government to segregation enforced with the help of the
federal government.
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Popular culture has used Baltimore as an icon of the crime, poverty and drugs
that plagues urban metropolitan centers across the United States. HBO’s The Wire
highlights the negative aspects of Baltimore: rows of vacant houses, a poor public school
system and deep-seeded poverty that leads to illegal drug abuse and violent crime.
Ironically, or perhaps not, almost all of Baltimore’s flaws are characterized as black.
Drug dealers and hit men are black, public school children are black, homeless addicts
are black. In fact, the only white characters on the show are politicians, schools teachers,
dockworkers and police officers. In five seasons of the show only season two tells a story
of white corruption and the story of corruption is told as a consequence of
deindustrialization – portside vice is not represented as the cause of industrial decline.
Along with a continued examination of black drug trafficking in Baltimore, season two
also presents a storyline about corrupt stevedores of the Baltimore port and their part in
an international smuggling organization. The Wire’s portrayal of many social vices as
black accurately reflects the mindset of many Baltimore citizens and leaders.
Furthermore, the portrayal of the city as racially segregated both residentially and in
terms of class, is reflective of current conditions in the city.
However, the story of Baltimore presented in The Wire, much like the story of the
city itself, is a metaphor for the issues and realities facing many American cities.
Although The Wire is about Baltimore, the characters and events have their counterparts
in other urban areas facing the same problems. Baltimore City demonstrates how
residential segregation corresponds to high levels of poverty, unemployment,
overcrowding. An idea that began with segregation ordinances in 1910 has grown into the
defining, though largely unrecognized, characteristic of a great American city.
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